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Abstract 
By possessing nuclear weapons, the United States Air Force is inherently exposed 
to extreme safety concerns. With multiple setbacks in recent years (e.g., unauthorized 
transport of nuclear weapons, cheating scandals, and career dissatisfaction), some have 
begun to wonder how safe the nuclear enterprise truly is. Building upon the concept of 
safety climate, this study explores safety climate constructs and trends associated with 
current nuclear maintenance safety climate survey data.  
First, exploratory factor analysis is used to explore the underlying psychometric 
structure of the nuclear maintenance Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System 
survey. Next, constructs extracted from the survey are compared across demographic 
variables in search of safety trends within the nuclear enterprise. Results confirm that a 
three-factor structure exists within survey data (consisting of Management Commitment, 
Resources, and Training constructs), and that differences in perceptions of these 
constructs exist across five of the seven explored variables (i.e., deployment to the 
intercontinental ballistic missile fields, rank, age, time in unit, and time in career field). 
Recommendations based on the findings are presented for leadership contemplation and 
action. 
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THEY’RE ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF 
SAFETY CLIMATE WITHIN THE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE 
 
I. Introduction 
Overview 
In 1945, the United States detonated the first nuclear weapon. Since that time, 
nuclear weapons have become a cornerstone of the United States’ strategic policy. In 
1959, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles were 
introduced, creating the foundations of what would become the “Nuclear Triad.” 
Currently, the United States Air Force is responsible for the custody and use of two legs 
of this triad. Beginning in 2007, and continuing through 2014, the Air Force experienced 
a string of events that negatively affected the perception of enterprise-wide safety. These 
incidents ultimately shined a spotlight on possible safety deficiencies within the nuclear 
enterprise.  
 This thesis will focus on identifying constructs of safety climate that exist within 
the current nuclear maintenance safety survey developed by the Air Force Safety Center, 
and how the resultant information may be utilized by leaders to make decisions regarding 
safety climate. Chapter 1 will provide a background of recent incidents potentially 
affecting nuclear safety, introduce the concept of safety climate in relation to 
organizational behavior, and explain what data will be analyzed from the survey. 
Additionally, a research problem and related investigative questions will be presented. To 
conclude, future implications for nuclear enterprise leaders’ decision making will be 
discussed. 
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Background 
In 2007, the United States Air Force unknowingly flew six nuclear weapons from 
North Dakota to Louisiana, starting a chain of events that led to a top-down restructuring 
of the Air Forces’ nuclear enterprise (Starr, 2007). During the 7 years following, the 
enterprise suffered multiple setbacks including wide-scale cheating by officers operating 
the weapon system, security failures, and career dissatisfaction by members within the 
nuclear enterprise (Burns & Baldor, 2014). With public opinion shifting negatively, 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel funded two reports and increased nuclear related 
funding by $311 million for the 2015 and 2016 fiscal years (Shinkman, 2014) 
Through initiatives like the Force Improvement Program, change came quickly 
and was introduced at all levels (Heikkinen, 2014; Pampe, 2014). Along with the 
negative events, these initiatives created rapid and widespread change that affected the 
day-to-day operations for both senior leadership and field level technicians alike, 
including an increased emphasis on implementing changes to increase safe operations in 
the nuclear career fields (McCullough, 2015). This emphasis coincided with a 2006 call 
by the Secretary of Defense to reduce mishaps across the Air Force by 75%. (AFSEC, 
n.d.-a) 
A 30 year old idea may assist Air Force leadership in meeting the mishap 
reduction goal. In 1980, Dov Zohar proposed the idea that there was a subset of 
organizational climate specifically related to safety. Since his landmark study, a 
multitude of researchers have found relationships between organizations’ safety climate 
and safety outcomes (Colley, Lincolne, & Neal, 2013). Knowledge of this relationship 
could be beneficial to decision-makers within the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Papers 
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have been written about safety climate within hospitals (Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & 
Baker, 2009), industrial organizations (Choudhry, Fang, & Lingard, 2009), and nuclear 
power plants (Morrow, Kenneth Koves, & Barnes, 2014), but currently, relationships 
between safety climate and safety performance within the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise 
have not been adequately explored. 
 
Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System 
 One self-described “safety tool” that the Air Force utilizes is the Air Force 
Combined Mishap Reduction System (AFCMRS) (AFSEC, n.d.-a). The AFCMRS 
program is an assessment program that was instituted in response to the Secretary of 
Defense’s 2003 goal of reducing mishaps by 50% (AFSEC, n.d.-a). AFCMRS is meant to 
provide commanders and supervisors with a predictive tool regarding safety and does so 
in the form of a 15 separate surveys. This research will focus on the Nuclear Mission 
Maintenance Survey (see Appendix A: AFSEC Survey Questionnaire). Each survey is 
meant to focus on a single component (including, but not limited to, operations, 
maintenance, and protective equipment usage) and relies on self-reported perceptions. 
Every survey utilizes either a 7 or 8-point Likert scale and, depending on the survey 
version, offers the ability to enter comments on each item as well as answering open 
ended questions. Questions are not uniform across all surveys and each is tailored by the 
Air Force Safety Center’s Human Factors Division to focus on a single facet of safety. 
 Tasked with developing and maintaining measures to assess the Air Force safety 
culture, the Human Factors Division is responsible for the AFCMRS safety survey. 
(AFSEC, 2000) Staffed with experts from relevant fields within the Air Force (AFSEC, 
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2000) the Human Factors Division utilizes a theory-based approach to assess safety 
within the Air Force. With an understanding that human error is the largest cause of 
accidents (AFSEC, n.d.-b; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000) AFCMRS surveys focus on the human factors for risk mitigation 
efforts and uses the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model 
as the explanatory basis for their endeavors (AFSEC, n.d.-b) 
 The HFACS model (see Figure 1) is built upon James Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” 
model (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Reason’s model seeks to explain accidents and 
incidents as a sequential failure at multiple levels (Organizational influences, unsafe 
supervision, preconditions, and unsafe acts) and it is when all four of these levels fail that 
an accident will occur (Reason, 1990). The alignment of holes in the multiple levels 
(hence the “Swiss Cheese” moniker) allows for an accident to happen. In a similar vein, 
the HFACS model is built upon the assumption that accidents happen due to a causal 
relationship between multiple tiers, or defenses, and it is when failures occur at multiple 
levels that an accident occurs (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). This model drives the 
AFCMRS survey layout and developed measures are organized to align with the top two 
tiers of the HFACS model, Organizational Influences and Supervision (AFSEC, n.d.-b) 
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Figure 1. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  
model (AFSEC, n.d.-b) 
 
Research Question and Investigative Questions  
The purpose of this study is to explore safety climate constructs within current 
nuclear maintenance safety climate survey, ultimately answering the research question: 
RQ: How can the data from Air Force nuclear maintenance safety climate survey be 
analyzed in order to better inform decision makers on the existing safety climate within 
the Air Force nuclear enterprise?  
In pursuit of this purpose, the following investigative questions will be answered: 
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IQ1. What coherent safety climate (or other) constructs exist within the current nuclear 
maintenance Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System survey data? 
IQ2. What variables exist, within the existing survey, which may provide a basis for 
analysis of safety trends within the nuclear maintenance enterprise? 
IQ3. What trends, differences, or similarities, exist among the identified constructs and 
variables that may highlight existing trends useful for leadership situational awareness 
and decision making? 
 
Research Focus 
 This study will focus on all members of the Air Force nuclear maintenance 
enterprise. Safety climate data will be gleaned from the Air Force Safety Center’s 
Combined Mishap Reduction System survey and incorporates responses from officers, 
enlisted, and civilian members. Survey data consists of responses from members of both 
intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear-capable aircraft maintenance career fields 
and covers a time-in-service range from less than one month up to 20+ years of service.  
Methodology  
 Utilizing well-established safety literature, the researcher created a framework of 
nine dimensions (later reduced to three), through which, the Combined Mishap Reduction 
System survey data were analyzed. Dimension definitions are discussed in detail within 
Chapter 3. Validity of the constructs was validated by a sample group of Air Force 
Institute of Technology faculty and students. Following substantive validation of 
dimensions, exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and one-way analysis of variance was 
7 
 
performed to identify data-supported constructs and explore relationships among the 
identified constructs. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
  This study is limited by the current language of the Air Force Combined Mishap 
Reduction System survey. At the time of analysis, survey questions were not focused on 
measuring any given construct and the researcher assigned proposed constructs after the 
fact. Additionally, due to non-attributional policy, historical mishap data could not be 
obtained. This eliminated the possibility of more adequately analyzing the relationship 
between climate and outcome.  
Implications  
Utilizing the findings of this research, senior leaders will be able to determine 
how well safety concepts diffuse to the tactical-level units. Defining relationships 
between variables like age, time in service, and career field will provide valuable insight 
with which leadership can make informed decisions regarding resource allocation. By 
understanding the constructs available within the available data, and the magnitude of 
those constructs within, and across groups, leadership may be able to proactively predict 
and avoid negative outcomes.   
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II Literature Review 
Overview 
 This chapter will focus on the construct of safety climate and related concepts 
relevant to this research. To begin, research into the topic of safety climate will be 
identified and discussed. This review is followed by a discussion regarding commonly 
found themes within current academic research. After the content analysis, relevant 
dimensions within safety climate to be used for analysis will be defined.  
 
Safety Climate 
The idea of safety climate was originally proposed by Dov Zohar in 1980. Safety 
climate, Zohar hypothesized, was a sub-climate of organizational climate (Coyle, 
Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Zohar, 1980). Using a 40-item safety measure, Zohar 
validated the existence of a measurable climate within factories exhibiting an eight factor 
structure (safety training, management attitudes, safety’s effect on promotion, perceived 
risk, work pace, status of safety officer, effect on social status, and status of safety 
committee (Brown & Holmes, 1986)). Since his landmark study, safety climate research 
has continued across multiple industries and disciplines including, but not limited to, 
hospitals (Gershon et al., 2000), manufacturing facilities (R. L. Brown & Holmes, 1986; 
Johnson, 2007), and nuclear power plants (Carroll, 1998; Lee, 1998).  
Zohar (1980) initially hypothesized that safety climate was the sum of shared 
employee perceptions regarding organizational safety. Future researchers further 
delineated the definition as shared perceptions “of the value of safety” within the 
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organization (A. Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) with the “value” encompassing perceptions 
relevant to the “policies, procedures, and practices” of the organization (Colley et al., 
2013; A. Neal et al., 2000; Zohar, 2008). In a meta-analysis performed by Guldenmund 
(2000), 18 published works regarding safety climate and culture were compiled in search 
of a common theme within definitions. He found that safety climate was defined as 
“collective mental programming”, “everyone feels responsible for safety”, and “a… 
concept describing the safety ethics,” but most shared the common thread of perception 
(Guldenmund, 2000). No matter the nuances in definition, perception is important 
because it is generally accepted, even before Zohar’s research, that perception has a 
causal relationship with negative outcomes (Coyle et al., 1995).  
As the influence of the safety climate has grown, so have the implications. In his 
earliest work, Zohar predicted that a facet-specific construct existed that included a 
shared view by employees, but his initial research stopped short of pontificating on 
possible uses for the discovered factors aside from a means to measure feelings of safety 
(R. L. Brown & Holmes, 1986). As acceptance grew for this proposed climate, research 
began to take multiple directions. Cooper and Phillips (2004) suggest that safety climate 
research branched into four main disciplines: (a) Designing instruments with which to 
measure and analyze factor structures; (b) Developing and testing theoretical models; (c) 
Examining causal relationships between safety climate and safety outcomes; and (d) 
Exploring the relationship between safety climate and the parent organizational climate  
Research into the causal relationship between climate and outcomes has gained 
considerable traction in recent years. While Zohar did not include a predictive 
10 
 
determination in his original works, researchers have since attempted to both validate his 
results (with little success) (Coyle et al., 1995) and explore a predictive capability of 
safety climate (with mixed success) (Choudhry et al., 2009). A 2014 study by Stephanie 
Morrow and colleagues successfully linked perceptions with performance indicators at a 
U.S. nuclear power plant (Morrow et al., 2014) and Stephen Johnson established a 
statistically significant correlation in his 2007 study revolving around 292 employees 
involved in heavy manufacturing (Johnson, 2007). While some have failed to establish a 
correlation (I. Glendon, 2016), the possibility of a construct with predictive capabilities 
could provide leading performance indicators allowing organizations to prevent negative 
outcomes. 
 
Safety Outcomes 
Safety outcomes are the results of an individual’s decision to act safely or 
unsafely. Measured retroactively through accident rates and monetary impact (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004), outcomes are reactive in nature and provide managers with no predictive 
capabilities. Because positive safety outcomes result in a more productive organization, 
leadership at all levels should be concerned with reducing and preventing negative 
outcomes. This is increasingly true for high-risk industries where day to day operations 
include inherent hazards with higher risk of negative safety outcomes (Flin et al., 2000; 
Garcia-Herrero, Mariscal, Gutiierrez, & Toca-Otero, 2013).  
As research continues to strengthen the relationship between safety climate and 
safety outcomes, leaders can utilize safety climate as a predictive indicator of future 
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safety performance. Throughout safety literature, researchers have found that employees 
are more apt to adhere to safe workplace practices if they perceive their organization 
places a high value on safety (Colley et al., 2013). Leading indicators have begun to 
replace lagging indicators as human factors are recognized to be responsible for more 
negative safety outcomes than technical shortfalls (Choudhry et al., 2009; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). This relationship can provide valuable insight to decision 
makers as determinants of  safe work practices can be predictive in nature instead of 
lagging (Andrew Neal & Griffin, 2006).  
 
Prevalent Dimensions  
Many different scales have been utilized to measure safety climate. Zohar’s 
seminal study utilized a 40-item measure (1980) to identify eight dimensions influencing 
safety climate (Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997), and since, measures have 
remained as varied as the industries that they studied. A 1986 attempt was made to 
confirm the results of Zohar’s measure, but succeeded in only confirming three 
dimensions (Brown & Holmes, 1986). Williamson and colleagues (1997) point out that 
an attempt to replicate the Brown and Holmes study was unsuccessful and resulted in a 
further reduction to a two-facture structure (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991). Through a 
comprehensive review of academic works related to safety climate, Flin et al. (2000) 
found that measurement instruments ranged from 11 to 300 items and that dimensions 
within the construct of safety climate varied between 2 and 19 factors. Some of this wide 
variation can be accounted for by the career specificity of safety climate (Zohar, 2008) 
and differences in population demographics (R. L. Brown & Holmes, 1986) 
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Understanding that climate has multiple dimensions (Guldenmund, 2000) 
explains why such wide breadth of factors exists within research. Jones and James (1979) 
suggested that climate may consist of both core dimensions and dimensions applicable 
specifically to certain industries or studies, dependent upon hazards and expectations. 
Because of the wide variation of safety climate measures, commonality of factors is 
lacking within the field (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) and both Flin and 
Guldenmund attempted to identify common dimensions that managers could use in the 
measurement of safety climate. Flin ultimately found that the most frequently occurring 
dimensions were management, safety systems, risk, work pressure, and competence, but 
argues against accepting those five as universal (Flin et al., 2000).  
With a wide-range of dimensions proposed throughout literature, this study 
utilizes the following dimensions which exhibit a high frequency of occurrences within 
safety climate research: Management Action, Management Attitude, Safety v. 
Production, Resources, Status of Safety, Communication, Training, Active Supervisory 
Practice, and Perception of Risk.  Table 1 below provides a matrix of chosen dimensions, 
along with how frequently they were mentioned, and provided the outline for dimension 
development for this study.  
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Dimensions for this research were decided upon using a three-step process:  
1. Beginning with Flin and colleagues (2000) meta-analysis of common safety 
climate dimension as a starting point, relevant literature was reviewed for 
themes, measures, and discussion regarding dimensions relevant to measuring 
or predicting safety climate. 
2. Items relating to safety climate were extracted from articles and compiled into 
a list of 180 possibilities (see Appendix B). These items were references, 
measures, discussion points, citations, and concepts the author sought to 
research, measure, or included as research. 
3. The researcher reviewed and aligned similar items, ultimately settling on nine 
constructs that incorporated the 180 snippets. 
 
Table 1.  Prevalent Dimensions in 
Safety Climate Research 
Article
MA MB SP RE SS CM TG AS PR
Brown & Holmes, 1986 X X X
Carroll, J., 1998 X X X X X
Colley et al., 2013 X X X X X X
Conchie et al., 2013 X X X X
Cooper & Phillips, 2004 X X X X X
Coyle et al., 1995 X X X X X X
Dedobbeleer & Belland, 1991 X X
DeJoy, D. 2004 X X
Diaz & Cabrera, 1997 X X X X
Donald & Canter, 1994 X X
Evans et al., 2007 X X X X
Flin et al., 2000 X X X X X
Huang et al., 2013 a X X X X
Huang et al., 2013 b X X X X X
Janssens et al., 1995 X X X
Lee, T., 1998 X X X X
Mearns et al., 1997 X X X X X
Niskanen, T., 1994 X X X
Ostrom et al., 1993 X X X X X
Phillips et al., 1993 X X X X X
Rundmo, T., 1992 X X
Williamson et al., 1997 X X
Zohar, D., 1980 X X X X X
Zohar & Luria, 2005 X X X X X
Zohar, D., 2010 X X X X
Prevalent Dimensions
Note: MA - Management Attitude, MB - Management Action, SP - Safety v. Production, RE - Resources, SS - Status of Safety, CM - Communication, 
TG - Training, AS - Active Supervisory Practices, PR - Perceived Risk
14 
 
Management Attitude 
Management Attitude is a dimension concerned with the perception of how 
management views safety. Acting as an encompassing dimensions, Management Attitude 
is holistic in that it includes organization concepts such as enacted policy (policy that is 
observed instead of explicitly stated (Zohar, 2008), encouragement of safe practices, and 
espousing safety values. From an employee standpoint, Management Attitude can be 
identified with the question “How concerned is management with employee well-being?” 
(Brown & Holmes, 1986). The subcomponent of safety values is particularly important as 
values may be espoused by supervisors, while also being tacitly observed by employees, 
both of which have a suggested causal relationship with safety behaviors (Conchie, 
Moon, & Duncan, 2013).  
 
Management Action 
Management action refers to the respondents’ perceptions regarding actions taken 
by management. Common items associated with management action include formal 
policy regarding safety, rewarding and punishing for positive and negative safety 
practices, and supporting safety. In contrast to Management Attitude, Management 
Action is the individual perception of “How active is management in responding to 
concern?” (Brown & Holmes, 1986). It can be argued that measuring safety climate is, in 
and of itself, a way for management to measure employee perceptions and evaluation of 
actions taken by management (Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, & Mbaye, 2015).     
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Safety v. Production 
Safety versus Production encompasses the perceptions of the relationship between 
safety and other competing organizational goals (Zohar & Luria, 2003). Competing goals 
include numerous organizational activities (i.e. production or efficiency (Mearns et al., 
2013)) and that competition of goals influences employee perception. As perception 
influences risk-taking (Mearns et al., 2013) goal prioritization by organizations, both 
explicit and implicit, has an impact on safety climate. This organizational balancing act 
can prove to be difficult and can change depending on the situation (Carroll, 1998). 
 
Status of Safety 
The dimension Status of Safety encompasses the perception of the importance 
placed on entities creating, enforcing, or measuring safety policies. These entities include 
safety committees and safety officers (Donald & Canter, 1994; Zohar, 1980). For this 
research, the Safety Status construct will also include the influence of safety practices on 
social status of employees, another construct suggested by Zohar’s (1980) eight-factor 
safety climate structure. 
 
Communication  
Communication is comprised of the perception of effectiveness of communication 
regarding safety (both upwards and downward). Using methods similar to this study 
(Exploratory Factor Analysis), communication has appeared as an underlying structure 
for the road construction industry (Glendon & Litherland, 2001) and in the off-shore oil 
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industry (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998). During open-ended interviews with 
nuclear power plant employees, Carroll (1998) noted that lack of communication was a 
concern as expectations were never clearly stated  
 
Resources 
For this research, Resources is defined as the perception of adequacy and 
functionality of resources necessary for safety (manpower, equipment, facilities). 
Throughout initial research, the concept of resources was explained through multiple 
contexts: Trucks and Equipment (Huang et al., 2013), Safety Systems (Colley et al., 
2013), and Facilities (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993). Huang’s (2013) study 
suggested that providing the proper resources was an investment in employee safety. 
Colley and colleagues explored safety climate utilizing Neal et al.’s (2000) safety 
measure and suggested that providing a safe environment (providing needed resources) 
may correlate with achieving other goals.  
 
Training 
As a dimension, Training will relate to the perception of the importance and 
efficacy of safety training. As one of Dov Zohar’s (1980) original dimensions, 
importance of safety training was stressed as a strong discriminator between companies 
with strong safety records and companies that were lacking. Within additional research, 
Colley et al (2013) stress the importance of training perception and relate that perception 
to lower incident rates. In the nuclear realm, Terence Lee performed a 1998 study at a 
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nuclear power plant, treating training as characteristic of low accident plants and, for 
analysis, treated training as a major domain (Lee, 1998) 
 
Active Supervisory Practice 
Active Supervisory Practices relies on perception of first-line supervisory 
involvement and influence on safety procedures and practices. Research shows a strong 
correlation between a supervisor’s ability to enforce safety and an that organization’s 
ability to produce safe outcomes (Conchie et al., 2013). Conchie (2013) felt that 
supervisors were directly responsible for effective communication and safety coaching. 
This outlook is supported for nuclear career fields by John Carroll’s (1998) work 
examining employee perceptions at a nuclear power plant where a major concern was 
supervisors incapable of effective coaching. This concern is relevant because, along with 
a strong positive influence, supervisors also possess the ability to negative impact safety 
outcomes (Conchie et al., 2013). 
 
Perceived Risk  
 Perception of risk is used by this research as a somewhat all-encompassing 
dimension. Where safety climate literature proposed ideas not directly related to the 
aforementioned eight, the researcher attempted to create a dimension that could catch 
smaller ideas. Perceived risk was explicitly stated in a study of off-shore petroleum rigs 
(Rundmo, 1992) but was treated as a descendent. However, Rundmo (1992) did feel that 
perceived risk could be measured separately from actual risk. This concept is the basis for 
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the catch-all definition of perceived risk and consolidated items like physical work 
environment (Colley et al., 2013), perceived risk (Flin et al., 2000; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, 
& Fleming, 2001), risks (Lee, 1998), and risk perception (Brown & Holmes, 1986). The 
dimension itself can be summed up as “How safe do employees feel?” (Brown & 
Holmes, 1986). 
Summary 
 Safety climate is a shared perception of how people feel and may be a 
representation of how safe an organization is. Throughout literature, many dimensions 
have been proposed as common factors influencing safety climate and this research will 
adapt nine of those dimensions as a springboard for further analysis in an attempt to 
discover underlying factors within safety climate measures in the Air Force nuclear 
maintenance community. 
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III Methodology 
Overview 
 This chapter focuses on the methods used to gather, define, and validate 
dimensions used to define research constructs, as well as the methods used to explore the 
research data. Dimensions used for the study were gathered through extensive literature 
review. Relevant items were further refined and adapted by the researcher to develop 
constructs drawn from the Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System (AFCMRS) 
data provided by the Air Force Safety Center. Upon deciding upon relevant measures, 
each survey item (question) was validated for retention for further analysis. Once 
validated, Exploratory Factor Analysis was used to identify existing constructs within the 
data set, and assess their properties and magnitude across multiple groups.  
Survey Data 
 Data for this research was provided by the Air Force Safety Center. The Safety 
Center manages the AFCMRS survey used in this study, which is a survey designed to 
assess personnel perceptions of safety within organizations. The survey items utilize a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” The survey 
also includes two additional options for “Not Applicable” and “Don’t Know” resulting in 
a scoring system of 2-6 for level of agreement, 1 for “Don’t Know” and 0 for “Not 
Applicable.” 
 Currently, 11 versions of the survey are available. Data provided by the Air Force 
Safety Center for this research is composed of the 65-item nuclear maintenance version 
of the survey. This version is specifically slated to measure safety in relation to Nuclear 
Surety and includes responses from career fields involved in the operation, maintenance, 
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and support of the nuclear mission. Due to the scope of this study, survey participants 
operating outside of the nuclear surety environment, and AFCMRS surveys non-nuclear 
in nature, are not included.  
Survey Demographics  
The survey data obtained covered a timeframe of 96 months (15 June 2009 to 7 June 
2017) and included 17,660 responses (see Table 2). Sixty-four unique organizations were 
identified by coding provided by the Air Force Safety Center.  
Respondents included civilian employees (General Schedule and Federal Wage 
System), active duty enlisted members (grades E1-E9), active duty officers (grades O1-
O6) and a smattering of other responses (federal civilian employees, warrant officers, 
cadets, and governmental contractors). Grades E4-E6 (n = 10471) were the largest 
respondent group, accounting for 59.3% of survey responses and when combined, 
enlisted responses (n = 16,462) accounted for 93.2% of responses. In comparison, officer 
(n = 582) respondents amassed 3.3% of responses. All civilian respondents were grouped 
into “other” (n = 616) and were responsible for 3.5% of data points. 
Another data point of note is age. Five choices were given by the survey: Less 
than 21 years of age, 21-22 years, 23-24 years, 25-30 years, and over 30 years old. The 
largest response group was the over 30 group (n = 5335) with 30.2% of responses 
identifying with this age group. In contrast, the smallest group was the below 21 years 
old group (n = 1742) accounting for 9.9% of overall responses.  
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Time in career field and time in unit data were also gathered. Time in career field 
was measured with seven possible responses: Less than one year, 1-2 years, 3-5 years, 6-
10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, and greater than 20 years. The results indicated that 3-
5 years’ time in career field (n = 4422) led 1-2 years (n = 3457) and 6-10 years (n = 
3443) with 25.0%, 19.6%, and 19.5% of responses, respectively. The smallest 
representation was the over 20 year group (n = 1087) with 6.2% followed by 16-20 years 
(n = 1427) and less than 1 year (n = 1549) with 8.1% and 8.8% respectively.  
Time in unit data allowed the largest span of options with nine groups identified: 
less than 1 month, 1 to 3 months, 4 to 6 months, 7 to 12 months, 13 to 24 months, 2 to 5 
Time in Career (years)
Frequency 
(n)
Cumulative 
%
Frequency 
(n)
Cumulative 
%
E1-E3 4137 23.4% <1 1549 8.8%
E4-E6 10471 82.7% 1-2 3457 28.3%
E7-E8 1694 92.3% 3-5 4422 53.4%
E9 160 93.2% 6-10 3443 72.9%
O1-O3 422 95.6% 11-15 2275 85.8%
O4-O5 160 96.5% 16-20 1427 93.8%
Other 616 100.0% 20+ 1087 100.0%
Frequency 
(n)
Cumulative 
%
Frequency 
(n)
Cumulative 
%
Yes 1204 6.8% ICBM 5053 28.6%
No 6669 44.6% Bomber 10044 85.5%
Other 2563 100.0%
Frequency 
(n)
Cumulative 
%
<1 month 490 2.8% Frequency (n)
Cumulative 
%
1 to 3 months 545 5.9% <21 1742 9.9%
4 to 6 months 526 8.8% 21-22 2708 25.2%
7 to 12 months 2314 21.9% 23-24 2711 40.5%
13 to 24 months 3974 44.4% 25-30 5164 69.8%
2 to 5 years 6446 80.9% >30 5335 100.0%
6 to 10 years 1548 89.7%
11 to 20 years 558 92.9%
> 20 years 1259 100.0%
Note: Demographics represent original 
data set provided by Air Force Safety 
Center
Rank
Age (years)
Missile Field Deployer Primary Weapon 
System
Time in Unit
Table 2. Demographic Data for AFCMRS 
Survey Data 
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years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, and greater than 20 years. The largest swath of data 
comes from the 2 to 5 years in unit group (n = 6446) with 36.5% of respondents 
identifying that group. The top three are rounded out by 13 to 24 months (n = 3974) and 7 
to 12 months (n = 2314) representing 22.5% and 13.1%, respectively, of overall 
responses. The smallest three groups, in rank order from smallest to largest, are less than 
1 month (n = 490), 4 to 6 months (n = 526), and 1 to 3 months (n = 545) accounting for 
2.8, 3.0, and 3.1% of items. Respondents with less than two years’ time in unit (n = 7849) 
represented 44.4% of survey responses and alludes to young pool of respondents.  
Starting in 2013, the Air Force Safety Center began to track whether respondents 
deployed to the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile complex in performance of their duties. 
Because of this question change, only 7,873 respondents can be identified by this 
demographic. For the data as a whole, missile field deployers (n = 1204) made up 6.8% 
of responses and non-deployers (n = 6669) accounted for 37.8%. Since 9,787 data points 
were collected before the inclusion of this question more sense can be made from looking 
at percentages following the new question. For 2013, and onward, survey data non-
deployers (n = 6669) accounted for 84.7% responses and dwarfed deployer responses (n 
= 1204). 
Along with missile field deployers and non-deployers, the AFCMRS survey 
gathers information regarding the primary weapon system maintained by the respondents. 
Choices available include: Bomber, Fighter/Attack, ICBM, Rescue, Special Duty, 
Tanker, Trainer, Transport, Unmanned Vehicles, and an option for “Not Applicable.” The 
majority of respondents identified Bombers (n = 10,044) making up 56.9% of data points, 
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with ICBMs (n = 5053) accounting for 28.6%. With small values, all other systems were 
combined into an “Other” category (n = 2563) and amounted to 14.5% of gathered data.  
 This sample serves as an adequate representation of manning within the nuclear 
enterprise. Utilizing data provided by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), the ratio of 
logistics (somewhat synonymous with maintenance for the purposes of this section) 
personnel within the nuclear command (officers = 2.3%; enlisted = 97.7%) is 
exceptionally close to survey demographics with officer responses accounting for 3.4% 
of responses and enlisted responses covering the remaining 96.6% (Air Force Personnel 
Center, 2018a, 2018b). Anecdotally, the disparity between sample sizes for Weapon 
System is also an accurate reflection since units associated with bomber wings are more 
heavily manned than their ICBM counterparts. Additionally, Time in Unit accurately 
mirrors typical tour length with 80.9% of respondents reporting less than 5 years’ Time in 
Unit. In the author’s opinion, survey demographics provide an adequate representation of 
the career fields answering the AFCMRS survey. 
 
Developing Dimensions 
The AFCMRS survey consists of five predefined subsections: Organizational 
Processes, Organizational Climate, Resources, Supervision, and Open-ended response 
items. For the purposes of this research, the titles of these subsections were discarded and 
multiple survey items were deleted prior to validation. That is, three open-ended 
questions were excluded from this study because the purpose of this study was to conduct 
a quantitative analysis of the survey data. Nine items quantitative survey items were 
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removed because the content did not relate to the purpose of this study. Specifically, 
deletion of items was based on three criteria: 
1. The question relates to an organization besides the one to which most 
respondents belonged.  (Major Command recognition programs adequately 
recognize my squadron/organization for outstanding nuclear security 
practices) 
2. The question relates to a concept besides safety. (e.g. In my 
squadron/organization, everyone is responsible/accountable for nuclear 
security) 
3. The question did not relate to any proposed dimension of safety climate (e.g. 
Maintenance records are correctly maintained, are accurate, and controlled in 
my squadron/organization.) 
After elimination of irrelevant and out-of-scope items and open-ended items, 53 
questions remained that were considered relevant to the study (see Appendix C: 
AFCMRS Measures retained for study ). 
 Redefining the constructs was necessary due to the ambiguity of current measure 
structure. Current AFCMRS structure relies on the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) model (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). HFACS proposes 
that the majority of accidents can be attributed to human error and, by using this model, 
the AFCMRS survey considers two factors when categorizing data (Organizational and 
Supervisory influences) (AFSEC, n.d.-a). While relevant research does support a multi-
level model for safety climate emphasizing group and organizational level influence 
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(Zohar & Luria, 2005) the author felt that exploring the psychometric structure of the 
data set would provide a more holistic approach to exploring the survey responses and 
possible constructs. 
Safety Climate Dimensions 
 With little agreement on universal factors within the construct of safety climate 
(Flin et al, 2000), the author chose to rely on dimensions with a high rate of occurrence in 
similar studies. Drawing from 34 publications, 9 dimensions (see Table 3) were initially 
identified as common factors in safety climate research. Dimensions were chosen based 
on the number of occurrences within reviewed literature and occurrences referenced the 
dimension as important, utilized the dimension in a safety climate measure, or discussed 
the dimension’s impact on safety climate. Following initial selection, these nine 
dimensions were subjected to a three-step process to determine relevance to the 
AFCMRS survey structure. First, discussion with two subject matter experts ensured 
suitability of proposed dimensions. Next, proposed dimensions underwent validation 
through a peer-review exercise. Lastly, dimensions were compared to underlying 
structure of data through principal component analysis.  
Table 3. Occurrence Rate of Proposed Dimensions through Research 
 
Construct Occurrences 
Management Attitude 24
Management Action 10
Percieved Risk 20
Training 17
Active supervisory practices 29
Safety v Production 8
Communication 11
Equipment & Facilities (Resources) 9
Status of Safety 15
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Validating Dimensions 
 As this study is exploratory in nature, the assignment of dimensions required 
validation, both internal and external, prior to performing any type of quantitative 
analysis. In accordance with Anderson and Gerbing’s procedure (1991), substantive 
validity of dimensions was evaluated through an “item-sort task” (Appendix D: Data 
Validation Exercise Instructions). The task consisted of a matching exercise through 
which participants were asked to match the 53 selected items with the most appropriate of 
the 9 preselected dimensions (see Appendix E). The test consisted of two versions (see 
Appendices F and G) which were randomly sorted using Microsoft Excel’s “RAND” 
function. Initial content analysis was performed by one professor and one doctoral 
student familiar with the “item-sort task” method and safety climate theory in order to 
ensure proper content, formatting, and instruction. Feedback from both researchers was 
used to refine the exercise definitions and test composition. Following modification, 
substantive validity testing was performed on a sample group of 14 Air Force officers 
attending the Air Force Institute of Technology. 
 Survey item retention and assignment of survey items to dimensions was 
performed using Anderson and Gerbing’s (1991) procedure. By calculating substantive 
validity coefficients (csv) for each survey item, the researcher could determine the 
strength of substantive validity of each dimension. The csv is calculated by:  
𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 − 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜
𝑁𝑁
 
Where 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐  is the number of respondents that assign the expected dimension to a survey 
item, 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜  is the number of respondents that assign any other dimension to a survey item, 
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and N is the total number of respondents. The researcher utilized csv as the ultimate 
decision-making device for both survey item retention and assignment of dimensions to 
each item, discarding measures with  csv < 0.50. 
Measure Retention 
Following peer-validation testing of proposed dimensions, the author sought to purify the 
measure items provided by the Safety Center survey. 53 measures from the original 
AFCMRS survey were included on the peer-validation surveys. Of those items, only 21 
met the required csv value and were retained for further analysis. Those measures are 
highlighted in Table 4.  
Dimension Refinement 
At the conclusion of the item-sort task, the initial pool of nine suspected 
dimensions was reduced to six dimensions. Safety v. Production and Perceived risk were 
eliminated due to low substantive validity coefficients on assigned measures (highest csv 
of 0.00 and -0.25 respectively). Management Attitude and Management Action were 
Measure
Hypothesized 
Construct
csv Measure
Hypothesized 
Construct
csv
3 TG 0.500 38 PR -0.250
6 TG 0.750 39 PR -0.375
7 TG 1.000 40 RE 1.000
8 AS 0.625 41 RE 0.500
11 RE 1.000 42 RE 1.000
12 AS -0.625 43 SP 0.000
14 MC -0.750 44 SP -0.250
15 MC -0.250 45 SP -0.500
16 SP -0.375 46 SP -0.625
17 MC 0.625 47 SP -0.500
19 RE 0.000 48 SP 0.000
20 MC -0.125 49 PR -0.500
21 CM 1.000 50 PR -0.250
22 CM 0.875 51 RE 0.875
25 MC 0.000 52 AS -0.125
26 TG -0.500 53 CM 0.750
27 PR -0.875 54 AS 0.250
28 PR -0.375 55 AS 0.250
29 MC -0.125 56 MC 0.125
30 MC 0.000 57 MC 0.500
31 MC -0.125 58 MC 0.250
32 PR -0.500 59 MC 0.750
33 MC 0.625 60 MC 0.375
34 SS 0.500 61 MC -0.250
35 SS 0.625 62 AS 0.500
36 SS 0.750 63 MC 0.750
37 PR -0.500
Table 4. Summary of Substantive Validity 
Coefficients Following Validation 
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combined to form a single dimension, Management Commitment. Respondents strongly 
agreed that the two dimensions were subtly different and retained measures could be 
further strengthened with the combination. Prior to combining the two dimensions, no 
proposed Management Attitude or Management Action measure garnered a csv of 0.50 or 
higher. Following the development of a Management Commitment dimension, five 
measures achieved required csv value. (Measures 10, 23, 47, 49, and 53). After 
refinement, the original 53 measures were further reduced and 21 measures were retained 
for further analysis (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Number of Measures Assigned to Proposed Dimensions (Pre and Post-
Validation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# of measures # of measures
7 5
7 5
7 3
6 3
3 3
4 2
4
6
9
53 21Total Total
Resources
Safety v. Production
Mgmt Action
Active Sup. Practices
Communication
Training
Pre-Test Post-Test
Perceived Risk
Active Sup. Practices
Communication
Training
Status of Safety
Status of Safety
Resources
Mgmt CommitmentMgmt Attitude
Dimension Dimension
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IV Analysis 
Overview 
 This chapter will focus on data and analysis methods used in pursuit of the 
Research Question. All survey data was provided by the Air Force Safety Center. With an 
initial pool of 17,660 data points, a sample was randomly selected for analysis. The 
sample was conditioned to remove outliers and missing data. Conditioned data then 
underwent exploratory factor analysis to discover underlying factor structure. At the 
conclusion of multiple attempts, eliminating measures with excessive cross-loading or 
low communalities, three factors were discovered with Eigen values of greater than 1. 
With factor analysis complete, single-factor analysis was used to further illustrate 
differences between independent variables. 
Data Selection and Conditioning 
 Research began with 17,660 survey responses, encompassing nine years of 
AFCMRS survey responses. Due to a survey question change occurring in 2013, all data 
prior to 30 July 2013 was excluded from further analysis. After this exclusion, 7,873 
responses remained. To aid in factor analysis, a randomized 20% (n=1577) sample size 
was taken using Microsoft Excel’s “RAND” function. Due to missing data, further 
conditioning was performed utilizing method’s suggested by Hair and colleagues (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
  “Not Applicable” and “Don’t Know” answers were deleted and treated as 
missing data. Percentages of missing data were calculated for all measure items and 
survey respondents resulting in one question (Item 34) and 21 cases being deleted due to 
30 
 
an abnormally high percentage. In accordance with Hair (2010), questions were deleted 
due to a missing data percentages exceeding 15% (Item 34 was 19.91%) and cases were 
deleted if missing data percentages were greater than 50%.  
 Following deletion of cases with excessive missing data, cases with uniform 
responses across all items were examined. At this point, an additional 173 cases were 
eliminated due to singularly uniform responses. Of the deleted cases, a vast majority of 
those were respondents that answered “5” for all questions (117 cases).  
 Once the researcher had eliminated singularly uniform cases, cases with excessive 
missing data, and one item with excessive missing data, 1383 survey responses remained. 
For the remaining cases a mean-substitution method was utilized to account for missing 
Item Mean Std Dev
Personnel in my squadron/organization must possess the 
appropriate work experience and skills to receive qualifications
4.26 0.91
My training records are well maintained and accurate in my 
squadron/organization
4.23 0.81
I am adequately trained to competently conduct my job. 4.34 0.79
My squadron/organization adequately monitors daily operations 
to catch possible human errors
4.18 0.83
In my squadron/organization, required tools and equipment are 
available and serviceable
3.60 1.15
My squadron/organization adequately recognizes me or my 
subordinates for doing the correct procedures and maintenance 
3.57 1.19
Within my squadron/organization, effective communication exists 
up and down the chain of command
3.46 1.25
My squadron/organization effectively communicates pertinent 
information during shift changes
3.69 1.09
Unprofessional behavior that compromises PRP standards is not 
tolerated in my squadron/organization
4.32 0.75
QA/QAE is a well respected element of my squadron/organization 3.67 1.13
QA/QAE positions are sought after in my squadron/organization 3.71 1.00
I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget, and 
equipment) to accomplish my job
3.32 1.20
Day/Night crew has sufficient staffing to meet workload demands 
in my squadron/organization
3.34 1.21
My squadron/organization has adequate personnel to perform its 
current tasks
3.21 1.23
My squadron/organization has sufficient manning/assets to 
perform its current tasks
3.26 1.23
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are successful in 
communicating mission goals to unit personnel
3.87 1.01
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization care for both 
members' quality of life and mission accomplishment
3.80 1.10
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization react well to 
unexpected changes
3.64 1.10
Supervisors encourage members in my squadron/organization to 
always complete work actions before signing off
4.31 0.77
Leadership in my squadron/organization encourages personnel to 
report incidents/accidents
4.33 0.76
Table 6. Item Mean Used to Replace 
Missing Data 
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data by calculating the mean response for all non-missing and substituting that mean in 
place of missing data (Hair et al., 2010) (see Table 6). 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
For the purpose of exploring psychometric structure, Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) was utilized. EFA was chosen for the ability to analyze correlation between 
variables and establish factors for interrelated variables (Hair et al., 2010). The general 
rule is that sample size should be a 10:1 ratio (observations to variables) (Hair et al., 
2010) and, with the supplied data set (n=1383) a ratio of  69.15:1 was achieved. 
Sampling adequacy was further confirmed with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy of .947 (Kaiser, 1974). With sample size more than adequate the 
researcher used PASW Statistics 18 to perform all EFA iterations.  
Initial EFA was performed with latent root criterion (eigenvalue > 1) to ensure 
sufficient correlations existed within provided variables. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
examines the entire correlation matrix for variables (Hair et al., 2010) and the obtained 
significance level (sig. < .01) enforces that sufficient correlations exist to validate the 
efficacy of EFA. The first principal component analysis provided four components that 
met latent root criterion with eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining a cumulative 66.4% 
of variance.  
While the initial solution proved promising, examination of the factor loadings of 
each item suggested that component four explained little more variance (5.1%) than the 
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first three components. Only two measures (NSMX_35 and NSMX_36) exceeded 
loadings of .5 for component four, so additional EFA was performed in search of the best 
possible structure. As recommended by Hair and colleagues (2010), best structure can be 
sought by exploring analysis with both one more, and one less, factors. Additional 
solutions were sought by enforcing a Principal Component Analysis with three 
components in lieu of Eigen values greater than one.  
Eliminating component four and forcing only three components reduced the 
cumulative explained variance from 66.4% to 61.3%. As cumulative variance explained 
is acceptable for levels over 60% (Hair et al., 2010), three components still meet the rule-
of-thumb. After ensuring data adequacy and cumulative variance, crossloading and 
communality (shared variance) (see Table 7) were the next items of interest in 
deciphering the EFA. For ease of interpretation, factors were rotated using a Varimax 
rotation. The Varimax rotation is an orthogonal rotation and used with the assumption 
that components are uncorrelated (Hair et al., 2010). While other orthogonal rotations 
exist, Varimax often provides the strongest separation between components (Hair et al., 
2010) and, assuming a structure exists amongst variables, most rotation methods will lead 
to similar results (J. D. Brown, 2009)  
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Respecification of Factor Analysis 
In order to further strengthen the structure, the author evaluated the loading and 
communality for all items. With factor loading values of .30 and higher considered 
acceptably significant (Hair et al., 2010), items that loaded to more than one component 
at .30 or higher were considered as cross-loading and evaluated for deletion. 
Additionally, communalities of less than .5 were considered for deletion as common 
variance is too low (Hair et al., 2010). Ultimately, five items met criteria for crossloading 
(NSMX_11, NSMX_21, NSMX_33, NSMX_62, and NSMX_63) and one item’s 
(NSMX_36) communality fell below the threshold for acceptance.  
Respecification of analysis occurred seven times (see Appendix H: EFA 
Respecification Varimax Rotated Component Matrices). Between each iteration, the 
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .687 .577
NSMX_6 .723 .600
NSMX_7 .725 .557
NSMX_8 .676 .626
NSMX_17 .541 .435 .539
NSMX_21 .553 .642
NSMX_22 .619 .418 .569
NSMX_35 .579 .496
NSMX_36 .503 .566 .375
NSMX_40 .630 .714
NSMX_41 .578 .747
NSMX_42 .745 .797
NSMX_51 .807 .760
NSMX_53 .860 .661
NSMX_57 .832 .687
NSMX_59 .709 .651
NSMX_11 .716 .515
NSMX_33 .701 .574
NSMX_62 .577 .483 .570
NSMX_63 .605 .488 .605
Eigenvalue 9.322 1.893 1.047
Note:  Factor loadings < .4 are supressed
Item
Component
Communality
Table 7. Rotated Component Matrix: Initial 
Extraction with Varimax Rotation 
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researcher verified that all communalities remained above the selected tolerance and 
observed cross loading values. NSMX_36 was deleted first due to low communality. 
Deletion had a small effect on NSMX_35’s communality, but little to no effect on other 
variables. Due to the reduced communality, NSMX 35 was deleted with no negative 
effect on other variable communalities. In order of deletion, the following variables were 
then removed due to significant cross loading: NSMX_33, NSMX_11, NSMX_62, and 
NSMX_63. Following the sixth iteration of EFA, a simple structure became apparent 
with 13 items loading singularly across 3 components (Table 8). 
 
 Since data used for this analysis was composed of a five-point Likert scale, 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was used to ensure reliability of the scale (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004; Hair et al., 2010). Items were combined according to proposed component 
and analyzed using PASW Statistics 18’s reliability analysis. Cronbach’s alpha values of  
MC RE TG
NSMX_3   .656 .599
NSMX_6   .756 .664
NSMX_7   .820 .706
NSMX_17 .696   .610
NSMX_21 .782   .744
NSMX_22 .721   .645
NSMX_40  .719  .705
NSMX_41  .817  .779
NSMX_42  .892  .858
NSMX_51  .847  .798
NSMX_53 .753   .679
NSMX_57 .778   .723
NSMX_59 .766   .693
Eigenvalue 6.723 1.505 0.975
Cronbach's 
alpha .906 0.905 0.72
Communality
Note:  MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - 
Training. Factor loadings < .5 are supressed
Item
Component
Table 8. Rotated Component Matrix: Final 
Extraction with Vari ax Rotation 
35 
 
.60 or greater are considered acceptable in exploratory research (Hair et al., 2010) and all 
three components exceeded this value (Component 1 - .906, Component 2 - .905, and 
Component 3 - .720) 
 
Defining Components 
 A three-component structure was identified with the final iteration of EFA (see 
Table 9). Component 1 incorporated questions NSMX_17, NSMX_21, NSMX_22, 
NSMX_53, NSMX_57, and NSMX_59 with significant loadings, but differed slightly 
from originally proposed dimensions. Items NSMX_17, NSMX_57, and NSMX_59 were 
considered to correlate to Management Commitment and items NSMX_21, NSMX_22, 
and NSMX_53 were considered measurements associated with Communication. With a 
preponderance of previously discussed additional research focusing on the importance of 
Management Action as a key dimension of safety climate, the author felt comfortable 
incorporating Communication items under the dimension of Management Commitment 
for simplification of component definition. In addition, all three Communication items 
featured wording concerning management (squadron, organization, leaders, and 
supervisors) and their ability to properly communicate. For this purpose, the 
Communication dimension was incorporated into Management Commitment. Research 
by Evans, Glendon, and Creed (2007) attempted a similar study and identified a logical 
grouping between Management Commitment and Communication within the aviation 
industry, justifying their combination as a single factor.  
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 Components 2 and 3 aligned with previously proposed dimensions. With a heavy 
loading from questions NSMX_40, NSMX_41, NSMX_42, and NSMX_51 (all originally 
assigned to the Resources dimension), it can safely be assumed that Component 2 is a 
measure of Resources. Likewise, Component 3 is comprised of three questions originally 
assumed to measure Training (NSMX_3, NSMX_6, and NSMX_7) and for future 
analysis was considered to measure the Training dimension.  
  
 
For future analysis of means, all components were assigned composite scores 
associated with Management Commitment (MC), Resources (RC), and Training (TG). 
Each composite score was derived through a summation of item scores according to the 
item’s primary loading. (I.e. individual item scores for questions NSMX_3, NSMX_6, 
and NSMX_7 were summed to create the composite score associated with TG for SPSS 
MC RE TG
NSMX_17
.696   
NSMX_21
.782   
NSMX_22
.721   
NSMX_53
.753   
NSMX_57
.778   
NSMX_59
.766   
NSMX_40
 .719  
NSMX_41
 .817  
NSMX_42
 .892  
NSMX_51
 .847  
NSMX_3
  .656
NSMX_6
  .756
NSMX_7
  .820
I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget, and 
equipment) to accomplish my job
ComponentItem
Note: MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG- Training
My squadron/organization adequately recognizes me or my 
subordinates for doing the correct procedures and maintenance 
activities
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization react well to 
unexpected changes
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization care for both 
members' quality of life and mission accomplishment
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are successful in 
communicating mission goals to unit personnel
My squadron/organization effectively communicates pertinent 
information during shift changes
Within my squadron/organization, effective communication exists up 
and down the chain of command
I am adequately trained to competently conduct my job
My training records are well maintained and accurate in my 
squadron/organization
Personnel in my squadron/organization must possess the appropriate 
work experience and skills to receive qualifications
My squadron/organization has sufficient manning/assets to perform 
its current tasks. 
My squadron/organization has adequate personnel to perform its 
current tasks
Day/Night crew has sufficient staffing to meet workload demands in 
my squadron/organization
Table 9. Rotated Component Matrix with Associated 
Questions 
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analysis). For the composite scores, higher scores indicated a higher positive perception 
of each component. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 10.  
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Component Scores 
 
 
ANOVA Results 
  
 Upon initial review, the data provided by the Air Force Safety Center included 13 
potential groups for mean analysis (unit codenames, date completed, rank, missile field 
deployer status (does the individual deploy in support of the ICBM mission set?), age, 
time in career field, time in unit, work center, model aircraft, status (federal civilian or 
military), service status, primary weapon system, and branch of service). Of the provided 
data, two variables (work center and model of aircraft) were immediately excluded due to 
a lack of commonality in answers. Additionally, time to complete survey was deemed 
irrelevant to this study and was excluded. Individual unit information was not provided 
due to non-attributional polices regarding Air Force Safety Center data so that, along with 
participant numbers, was not put through any further analysis. After elimination, seven 
variables remained for further analysis (date completed, rank, missile field deployer 
status, age, time in career field, time in unit, and primary weapons system). With 
professional experience in the nuclear career field, the author deemed the remaining 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation Variance
MC 1383 6.00 30.00 22.0352 5.53381 30.623
RE 1383 4.00 20.00 13.1365 4.25813 18.132
TG 1383 3.00 15.00 12.8300 2.00223 4.009
Valid N 
(listwise)
1383
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variables relevant for further exploration and proceeded with mean testing to explore 
trends between the retained variables.  
Utilizing the three components developed from EFA (Management Commitment, 
Resources, and Training), the selected seven independent variables underwent mean 
testing via one-way analysis of variance (with PASW Statistics 18). Along with multiple 
comparison tests for each independent variable, homogeneity of variance assumptions 
were tested when statistically significant differences were found and, when homogeneity 
was lacking, two post hoc tests (Tukey Honest Significant Difference (HSD) and Dunnett 
T3) were conducted for comparisons. For tests with appropriate homogeneity, only the 
Tukey HSD post hoc test was conducted.  
   
Missile Field Deployers 
 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
deployer status on perception of Management Commitment, perception of Training, and 
perception of Resources. There was a statistically significant difference between groups 
regarding Training (F= 4.256, p < .039) but no statistically significant difference between 
groups regarding Management Commitment (F=.705, p < .401) and Resources (F=1.136, 
p < .287) (Table 11). The homogeneity of variance assumption for Management 
Commitment (Levene’s test: p = .108) and Training (Levene’s test: p = .891) were 
appropriate, while Resources was weak (Levene’s test: p = .007) (Table 11). The mean 
perception of training score for deployers (M = 12.55, SD = 2.06) was significantly 
different, and lower, than non-deployers (M = 12.87, SD = 1.99) (Table 12).  
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Primary Weapon System 
 
For statistical analysis, conditions were divided among three groups: ICBMs (n = 
377), Bombers (n = 877), and Other (n = 129). Other is comprised of all answers not 
specifically ICBM or bomber and includes, but is not limited to, tankers, transports, and 
fighter aircraft. This simplification was made to ensure an appropriate sample size, as all 
other systems accounted for only 130 data points of the 1383 within the sample.  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the 
conditions (primary weapon system affiliation) on perception of Management 
Table 12. Missile Field Deployer: Composite Score 
Descriptives 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Deployer 190 21.7221 5.12608 .37189 20.9886 22.4557 6.00 30.00
Non-
deployer
1193 22.0851 5.59641 .16203 21.7672 22.4030 6.00 30.00
Total 1383 22.0352 5.53381 .14880 21.7433 22.3271 6.00 30.00
Deployer 190 12.8308 3.78987 .27495 12.2884 13.3731 4.00 20.00
Non-
deployer
1193 13.1852 4.32749 .12529 12.9394 13.4310 4.00 20.00
Total 1383 13.1365 4.25813 .11450 12.9119 13.3612 4.00 20.00
Deployer 190 12.5520 2.06139 .14955 12.2570 12.8470 4.00 15.00
Non-
deployer
1193 12.8743 1.98995 .05761 12.7612 12.9873 3.00 15.00
Total 1383 12.8300 2.00223 .05384 12.7244 12.9356 3.00 15.00
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
MC
RE
TG
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Table 11. Missile Field Deployer: ANOVA and 
Homogeneity Results 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
21.590 1 21.590 .705 .401
Within 
Groups
42299.525 1381 30.630
Total 42321.115 1382
Between 
Groups
20.593 1 20.593 1.136 .287
Within 
Groups
25037.390 1381 18.130
Total 25057.982 1382
Between 
Groups
17.023 1 17.023 4.256 .039
Within 
Groups
5523.335 1381 4.000
Total 5540.358 1382
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
ANOVA Homogeneity
 
MC 2.593 0.108
RE 7.311 0.007
TG 0.019 0.891
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Commitment, perception of Training, and perception of Resources. There was no 
statistically significant difference between treatments’ effect regarding Management 
Commitment (F=2.095, p < .123), Resources (F=2.875, p < .057), or Training (F=1.432, 
p <.239). (see Table 13)  
Homogeneity of variance assumptions were strong for all three components; 
Management Commitment (Levene’s test: p = .672), Resources (Levene’s test: p = .532), 
and Training (Levene’s test: p = .871).  
Although no statistically significant difference was reported between conditions 
for Resources (F=2.875, p < .057), post hoc tests (Tukey HSD) (see Table 14) identified 
statistically significant differences between ICBM (M = 22.32, SD = 5.46) and Other (M: 
13.917, SD: 4.41) (see Table 14) regarding perception of Resources at p < .044. However 
no significant difference existed between Bombers (M: 13.13, SD: 4.26) and ICBMS or 
Other (Table 15).  
 
Table 13. Primary Weapon System: ANOVA 
and Homogeneity Results 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
128.098 2 64.049 2.095 .123
Within 
Groups
42193.017 1380 30.575
Total 42321.115 1382
Between 
Groups
103.975 2 51.988 2.875 .057
Within 
Groups
24954.007 1380 18.083
Total 25057.982 1382
Between 
Groups
11.472 2 5.736 1.432 .239
Within 
Groups
5528.886 1380 4.006
Total 5540.358 1382
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
ANOVA Homogeneity
 
MC 0.398 0.672
RE 0.631 0.532
TG 0.138 0.871
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Table 15. Primary Weapon System: 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Bomber .50184 .34053 .304 -.2971 1.3008
Other -.37531 .56401 .784 -1.6986 .9480
ICBM -.50184 .34053 .304 -1.3008 .2971
Other -.87714 .52142 .212 -2.1005 .3462
ICBM .37531 .56401 .784 -.9480 1.6986
Bomber .87714 .52142 .212 -.3462 2.1005
Bomber -.25343 .26188 .597 -.8679 .3610
Other -1.03988 .43375 .044 -2.0576 -.0222
ICBM .25343 .26188 .597 -.3610 .8679
Other -.78645 .40099 .122 -1.7273 .1544
ICBM 1.03988 .43375 .044 .0222 2.0576
Bomber .78645 .40099 .122 -.1544 1.7273
Bomber -.04121 .12327 .940 -.3304 .2480
Other -.33582 .20417 .227 -.8148 .1432
ICBM .04121 .12327 .940 -.2480 .3304
Other -.29461 .18875 .263 -.7375 .1482
ICBM .33582 .20417 .227 -.1432 .8148
Bomber .29461 .18875 .263 -.1482 .7375
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable (I) Primary Weapons 
System
(J) Primary Weapons 
System
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
ICBM
Bomber
Other
ICBM
Bomber
Other
ICBM
Bomber
Other
TG
RE
MC
Tukey 
HSD
Tukey 
HSD
Tukey 
HSD
Table 14. Primary Weapon System: Composite Score 
Descriptives 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
ICBM 377 22.3184 5.46014 .28121 21.7655 22.8714 6.00 30.00
Bomber 877 21.8166 5.55382 .18754 21.4485 22.1847 6.00 30.00
Other 129 22.6937 5.56437 .48992 21.7244 23.6631 9.00 30.00
Total 1383 22.0352 5.53381 .14880 21.7433 22.3271 6.00 30.00
ICBM 377 12.8788 4.16895 .21471 12.4566 13.3010 4.00 20.00
Bomber 877 13.1323 4.26399 .14398 12.8497 13.4149 4.00 20.00
Other 129 13.9187 4.41229 .38848 13.1500 14.6874 4.00 20.00
Total 1383 13.1365 4.25813 .11450 12.9119 13.3612 4.00 20.00
ICBM 377 12.7725 1.99967 .10299 12.5700 12.9750 4.00 15.00
Bomber 877 12.8137 1.99058 .06722 12.6818 12.9457 3.00 15.00
Other 129 13.1083 2.08097 .18322 12.7458 13.4709 3.00 15.00
Total 1383 12.8300 2.00223 .05384 12.7244 12.9356 3.00 15.00
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
MC
RE
TG
Descriptives
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
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Rank 
 For the rank variable, two data points were removed from the analysis due to a 
lack of conformity. Both data points identified as Warrant Officers and the sample size 
was deemed too small to be relevant. Additionally, all civilian grades were combined into 
a single dummy variable. Conditions were composed of seven groups: E1- E3 (n = 294), 
E4-E6 (n = 836), E7-E8 (n = 155), E9 (n = 15), O1-O3 (n = 40), O4-O5 (n = 13), and 
Civilian (n = 30) (see Table 16). For this random sample, no respondents possessed a 
rank above O5. Additionally, Civilian was comprised of all federal civilians regardless of 
pay grade identified in order to produce a more statistically relevant sample size. 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
seven conditions (rank) on perception of Management Commitment, perception of 
Training, and perception of Resources. There was a statistically significant difference 
regarding rank’s effect on all three components: Management commitment (F= 21.318, p 
< 0.001), Resources (F= 17.721, p < 0.001), and Training (F= 4.901, p < 0.001) (see 
Table 17).  
Homogeneity of variance assumptions were weak for Management Commitment 
(Levene’s test: p < .001) and Training (Levene’s test: p < .001), but acceptable for 
Resources (Levene’s test: p < .056) (see Table 17) so both Tukey HSD and Dunnett T3 
post hoc tests were conducted.  
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Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
E1-E3 294 24.1744 4.96886 .28979 23.6041 24.7448 6.00 30.00
E4-E6 836 20.8213 5.60467 .19384 20.4408 21.2018 6.00 30.00
E7-E8 155 23.3802 4.86403 .39069 22.6084 24.1520 6.00 30.00
E9 15 23.6458 4.84006 1.24970 20.9655 26.3262 14.00 30.00
O1-O3 40 24.1172 4.08230 .64547 22.8116 25.4228 14.00 30.00
O4-O5 13 28.3846 2.14237 .59419 27.0900 29.6792 25.00 30.00
Civilian 30 21.6174 4.47973 .81788 19.9446 23.2902 12.00 28.00
Total 1383 22.0352 5.53381 .14880 21.7433 22.3271 6.00 30.00
E1-E3 294 15.2733 3.75680 .21910 14.8421 15.7045 4.00 20.00
E4-E6 836 12.5828 4.26239 .14742 12.2934 12.8722 4.00 20.00
E7-E8 155 12.5753 4.06580 .32657 11.9302 13.2205 4.00 20.00
E9 15 11.8894 3.67668 .94931 9.8533 13.9254 4.00 17.00
O1-O3 40 11.6927 3.81979 .60396 10.4711 12.9143 4.00 20.00
O4-O5 13 14.6154 4.35007 1.20649 11.9867 17.2441 8.00 20.00
Civilian 30 12.4348 3.82362 .69809 11.0070 13.8625 5.00 20.00
Total 1383 13.1365 4.25813 .11450 12.9119 13.3612 4.00 20.00
E1-E3 294 17.6173 2.34108 .13653 17.3485 17.8860 8.00 20.00
E4-E6 836 16.7300 2.68052 .09271 16.5480 16.9119 4.00 20.00
E7-E8 155 17.2238 2.45098 .19687 16.8349 17.6127 4.00 20.00
E9 15 17.3749 2.20534 .56942 16.1536 18.5962 12.00 20.00
O1-O3 40 16.9659 2.50682 .39636 16.1642 17.7677 10.00 20.00
O4-O5 13 19.2308 1.09193 .30285 18.5709 19.8906 17.00 20.00
Civilian 30 16.8137 3.28124 .59907 15.5884 18.0389 4.00 20.00
Total 1383 17.0131 2.61060 .07020 16.8754 17.1508 4.00 20.00
MC
RE
TG
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Table 16. Rank: Composite Score Descriptive Statistics 
Table 17. Rank: ANOVA and Homogeneity Results 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
3599.380 6 599.897 21.318 .000
Within 
Groups
38721.735 1376 28.141
Total 42321.115 1382
Between 
Groups
1797.373 6 299.562 17.721 .000
Within 
Groups
23260.610 1376 16.905
Total 25057.982 1382
Between 
Groups
115.923 6 19.321 4.901 .000
Within 
Groups
5424.435 1376 3.942
Total 5540.358 1382
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
ANOVA Homogeneity
 
MC 5.484 0.000
RE 2.049 0.056
TG 3.651 0.001
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For the Management Commitment component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3) 
(Table 18) revealed statistically significant differences between the mean score of E1-E3 
(M = 24.17, SD = 4.97) and both E4-E6 (M = 20.82, SD = 5.60) and O4-O5 (M = 28.38, 
SD = 2.14) on perception of Management Commitment. Furthermore, statistically 
significant differences exists between the mean scores for E4-E6 (M = 20.82, SD = 5.60) 
and E7-E8 (M = 23.38, SD = 4.86), O1-O3 (M = 24.12, SD = 4.08), and O4-O5 (M = 
28.38, SD = 2.14). In addition to E4-E6, E7-E8’s (M = 23.38, SD = 4.86) mean score was 
statistically significantly different from O4-O5 (M = 23.38, SD = 4.86). No statistically 
significant difference in means was discovered for E9 mean response (M = 23.65, SD = 
4.84) in comparison to the six other conditions. One more statistically significant 
difference in means was found for O1-O3 (M = 23.38, SD = 4.86) when compared to O4-
O5 (M = 23.38, SD = 4.86). The composite score for O4-O5 shares a statistically 
significant difference in mean with Civilian (M = 21.62, SD = 4.48).  
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Table 18. Rank: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Management Commitment) 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
E4-E6 3.35315 .34864 .000 2.2920 4.4143
E7-E8 .79427 .48643 .894 -.6912 2.2798
E9 .52860 1.28286 1.000 -4.0097 5.0669
O1-O3 .05724 .70754 1.000 -2.1819 2.2964
O4-O5 -4.21018 .66109 .000 -6.4949 -1.9255
Civilian 2.55703 .86771 .104 -.2521 5.3662
E1-E3 -3.35315 .34864 .000 -4.4143 -2.2920
E7-E8 -2.55888 .43613 .000 -3.8943 -1.2235
E9 -2.82455 1.26464 .480 -7.3386 1.6895
O1-O3 -3.29591 .67395 .000 -5.4481 -1.1437
O4-O5 -7.56333 .62501 .000 -9.7941 -5.3326
Civilian -.79612 .84054 1.000 -3.5414 1.9492
E1-E3 -.79427 .48643 .894 -2.2798 .6912
E4-E6 2.55888 .43613 .000 1.2235 3.8943
E9 -.26567 1.30934 1.000 -4.8429 4.3115
O1-O3 -.73703 .75450 1.000 -3.1038 1.6297
O4-O5 -5.00445 .71112 .000 -7.3852 -2.6237
Civilian 1.76276 .90641 .671 -1.1423 4.6678
E1-E3 -.52860 1.28286 1.000 -5.0669 4.0097
E4-E6 2.82455 1.26464 .480 -1.6895 7.3386
E7-E8 .26567 1.30934 1.000 -4.3115 4.8429
O1-O3 -.47136 1.40655 1.000 -5.2306 4.2879
O4-O5 -4.73878 1.38376 .050 -9.4738 -.0038
Civilian 2.02843 1.49355 .969 -2.9347 6.9916
E1-E3 -.05724 .70754 1.000 -2.2964 2.1819
E4-E6 3.29591 .67395 .000 1.1437 5.4481
E7-E8 .73703 .75450 1.000 -1.6297 3.1038
E9 .47136 1.40655 1.000 -4.2879 5.2306
O4-O5 -4.26742 .87732 .000 -7.0926 -1.4423
Civilian 2.49979 1.04190 .322 -.7897 5.7893
E1-E3 4.21018 .66109 .000 1.9255 6.4949
E4-E6 7.56333 .62501 .000 5.3326 9.7941
E7-E8 5.00445 .71112 .000 2.6237 7.3852
E9 4.73878 1.38376 .050 .0038 9.4738
O1-O3 4.26742 .87732 .000 1.4423 7.0926
Civilian 6.76721 1.01094 .000 3.5144 10.0200
E1-E3 -2.55703 .86771 .104 -5.3662 .2521
E4-E6 .79612 .84054 1.000 -1.9492 3.5414
E7-E8 -1.76276 .90641 .671 -4.6678 1.1423
E9 -2.02843 1.49355 .969 -6.9916 2.9347
O1-O3 -2.49979 1.04190 .322 -5.7893 .7897
O4-O5 -6.76721 1.01094 .000 -10.0200 -3.5144
Civilian
E9
O1-O3
O4-O5
Dunnett 
T3
E1-E3
E4-E6
E7-E8
Dependent Variable (I) Rank (J) Rank Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
MC
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
E4-E6 2.69047 .27878 .000 1.8673 3.5136
E7-E8 2.69794 .40812 .000 1.4929 3.9030
E9 3.38390 1.08833 .031 .1704 6.5974
O1-O3 3.58059 .69290 .000 1.5347 5.6265
O4-O5 .65788 1.16527 .998 -2.7828 4.0986
Civilian 2.83851 .78802 .006 .5117 5.1653
E1-E3 -2.69047 .27878 .000 -3.5136 -1.8673
E7-E8 .00748 .35956 1.000 -1.0542 1.0691
E9 .69344 1.07107 .995 -2.4691 3.8560
O1-O3 .89012 .66546 .834 -1.0748 2.8550
O4-O5 -2.03258 1.14916 .570 -5.4257 1.3605
Civilian .14804 .76401 1.000 -2.1078 2.4039
E1-E3 -2.69794 .40812 .000 -3.9030 -1.4929
E4-E6 -.00748 .35956 1.000 -1.0691 1.0542
E9 .68596 1.11177 .996 -2.5968 3.9687
O1-O3 .88265 .72916 .890 -1.2703 3.0356
O4-O5 -2.04006 1.18719 .604 -5.5455 1.4653
Civilian .14057 .82009 1.000 -2.2809 2.5620
E1-E3 -3.38390 1.08833 .031 -6.5974 -.1704
E4-E6 -.69344 1.07107 .995 -3.8560 2.4691
E7-E8 -.68596 1.11177 .996 -3.9687 2.5968
O1-O3 .19669 1.24482 1.000 -3.4789 3.8723
O4-O5 -2.72602 1.55798 .582 -7.3263 1.8742
Civilian -.54540 1.30017 1.000 -4.3844 3.2936
E1-E3 -3.58059 .69290 .000 -5.6265 -1.5347
E4-E6 -.89012 .66546 .834 -2.8550 1.0748
E7-E8 -.88265 .72916 .890 -3.0356 1.2703
E9 -.19669 1.24482 1.000 -3.8723 3.4789
O4-O5 -2.92271 1.31262 .282 -6.7985 .9531
Civilian -.74208 .99302 .990 -3.6742 2.1900
E1-E3 -.65788 1.16527 .998 -4.0986 2.7828
E4-E6 2.03258 1.14916 .570 -1.3605 5.4257
E7-E8 2.04006 1.18719 .604 -1.4653 5.5455
E9 2.72602 1.55798 .582 -1.8742 7.3263
O1-O3 2.92271 1.31262 .282 -.9531 6.7985
Civilian 2.18062 1.36522 .684 -1.8505 6.2117
E1-E3 -2.83851 .78802 .006 -5.1653 -.5117
E4-E6 -.14804 .76401 1.000 -2.4039 2.1078
E7-E8 -.14057 .82009 1.000 -2.5620 2.2809
E9 .54540 1.30017 1.000 -3.2936 4.3844
O1-O3 .74208 .99302 .990 -2.1900 3.6742
O4-O5 -2.18062 1.36522 .684 -6.2117 1.8505
Dependent Variable (I) Rank (J) Rank Mean 
Difference 
(I-J)
  
Interval
RE
Std. Error
Tukey 
HSD
E1-E3
E4-E6
E7-E8
Sig.
E9
O1-O3
O4-O5
Civilian
Table 19. Rank: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Resources) 
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For the Resources component, post hoc comparison (Tukey HSD)(Table 19) 
revealed statistically significant differences between the mean score of E1-E3 (M = 
15.27, SD = 3.76) and E4-E6 (M = 12.58, SD = 4.26), E7-E8 (M = 12.58, SD = 4.07), E9 
(M = 11.89, SD = 3.68), O1-O3 (M = 11.69, SD = 3.82), and Civilian (M = 12.43, SD = 
3.82). There was no significant difference between means for E1-E3 (M = 15.27, SD = 
3.76) and O4-O5 (M = 14.62, SD = 4.35). E4-E6, E7-E8, E-9, and Civilians had no 
statistically significant difference in mean between any other conditions besides E1-E3.  
For the Training component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3)(Table 20) 
revealed that O4-O5 (M = 14.46, SD = .78) was the standout with a statistically 
significant composite score mean difference between E1-E3 (M = 13.23, SD = 1.78), E4-
E6 (M = 12.65, SD = 2.06), E7-E8 (M = 12.97, SD = 1.88), O1-O3 (M = 12.57, SD = 
2.09), and Civilian (M = 12.74, SD = 2.52). The only nonsignificant difference occurred 
when compared to E9 (M = 13.11, SD = 1.72). A statistically significant difference in 
means was discovered between E1-E3 (M = 13.23, SD = 1.78) and E4-E6 (M = 12.65, 
SD = 2.06) and no significant difference in means was revealed between E9 and any 
other condition. 
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Age  
 A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
five age conditions: <21 (n = 124), 21-22 (n = 176), 23-24 (n = 214), 25-30 (n = 398), 
and >30 (n = 471) (see Table 21) on perception of Management Commitment, perception 
of Training, and perception of Resources. There was a statistically significant difference 
regarding age’s effect on all three components: Management Commitment (F= 16.389, p 
< 0.001), Resources (F= 18.304, p < 0.001), and Training (F= 3.361, p < 0.010). (Table 
22)  
Table 20. Rank: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Training) 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
E4-E6 .57646 .12609 .000 .1927 .9602
E7-E8 .25313 .18347 .977 -.3074 .8137
E9 .11877 .45514 1.000 -1.4907 1.7282
O1-O3 .69066 .34701 .635 -.4166 1.7979
O4-O5 -1.23452 .23911 .001 -2.0616 -.4074
Civilian .48611 .47211 .999 -1.0570 2.0292
E1-E3 -.57646 .12609 .000 -.9602 -.1927
E7-E8 -.32333 .16707 .680 -.8351 .1884
E9 -.45769 .44878 .997 -2.0587 1.1433
O1-O3 .11420 .33862 1.000 -.9720 1.2004
O4-O5 -1.81098 .22677 .000 -2.6197 -1.0023
Civilian -.09035 .46598 1.000 -1.6195 1.4388
E1-E3 -.25313 .18347 .977 -.8137 .3074
E4-E6 .32333 .16707 .680 -.1884 .8351
E9 -.13436 .46815 1.000 -1.7634 1.4947
O1-O3 .43753 .36390 .993 -.7138 1.5889
O4-O5 -1.48765 .26304 .000 -2.3617 -.6136
Civilian .23298 .48466 1.000 -1.3395 1.8055
E1-E3 -.11877 .45514 1.000 -1.7282 1.4907
E4-E6 .45769 .44878 .997 -1.1433 2.0587
E7-E8 .13436 .46815 1.000 -1.4947 1.7634
O1-O3 .57189 .55310 .998 -1.2424 2.3862
O4-O5 -1.35329 .49262 .198 -3.0367 .3301
Civilian .36734 .63905 1.000 -1.6943 2.4290
E1-E3 -.69066 .34701 .635 -1.7979 .4166
E4-E6 -.11420 .33862 1.000 -1.2004 .9720
E7-E8 -.43753 .36390 .993 -1.5889 .7138
E9 -.57189 .55310 .998 -2.3862 1.2424
O4-O5 -1.92518 .39489 .000 -3.1815 -.6689
Civilian -.20455 .56714 1.000 -1.9999 1.5908
E1-E3 1.23452 .23911 .001 .4074 2.0616
E4-E6 1.81098 .22677 .000 1.0023 2.6197
E7-E8 1.48765 .26304 .000 .6136 2.3617
E9 1.35329 .49262 .198 -.3301 3.0367
O1-O3 1.92518 .39489 .000 .6689 3.1815
Civilian 1.72064 .50834 .033 .0803 3.3610
E1-E3 -.48611 .47211 .999 -2.0292 1.0570
E4-E6 .09035 .46598 1.000 -1.4388 1.6195
E7-E8 -.23298 .48466 1.000 -1.8055 1.3395
E9 -.36734 .63905 1.000 -2.4290 1.6943
O1-O3 .20455 .56714 1.000 -1.5908 1.9999
O4-O5 -1.72064 .50834 .033 -3.3610 -.0803
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
O4-O5
Civilian
Dunnett 
T3
E1-E3
E4-E6
E7-E8
E9
O1-O3
TG
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable (I) Rank (J) Rank Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
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Homogeneity of variance assumptions for Management Commitment (Levene’s 
test: p < .001), Resources (Levene’s test: p < .001), and Training (Levene’s test: p < .002) 
were tenuous and, as such, both proposed post hoc tests were conducted with Dunnett T3 
used for comparison 
 
  
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
<21 124 24.8771 4.20655 .37776 24.1293 25.6248 16.00 30.00
21-22 176 22.5728 5.13315 .38693 21.8092 23.3365 9.00 30.00
23-24 214 20.7299 5.98958 .40944 19.9228 21.5370 6.00 30.00
25-30 398 21.0400 5.79628 .29054 20.4688 21.6112 6.00 30.00
>30 471 22.5202 5.18431 .23888 22.0508 22.9896 6.00 30.00
Total 1383 22.0352 5.53381 .14880 21.7433 22.3271 6.00 30.00
<21 124 15.6962 3.41780 .30693 15.0887 16.3038 6.00 20.00
21-22 176 14.2124 3.86141 .29106 13.6380 14.7869 4.00 20.00
23-24 214 12.8408 4.37249 .29890 12.2516 13.4300 4.00 20.00
25-30 398 12.6900 4.50547 .22584 12.2460 13.1340 4.00 20.00
>30 471 12.5723 4.02561 .18549 12.2078 12.9368 4.00 20.00
Total 1383 13.1365 4.25813 .11450 12.9119 13.3612 4.00 20.00
<21 124 17.5764 2.24208 .20134 17.1778 17.9749 8.00 20.00
21-22 176 17.2712 2.47679 .18669 16.9027 17.6397 10.00 20.00
23-24 214 16.5793 2.75971 .18865 16.2075 16.9512 6.00 20.00
25-30 398 16.8083 2.81916 .14131 16.5305 17.0861 4.00 20.00
>30 471 17.1384 2.45556 .11315 16.9161 17.3607 4.00 20.00
Total 1383 17.0131 2.61060 .07020 16.8754 17.1508 4.00 20.00
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
MC
RE
TG
Descriptives
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Table 21. Age: Composite Score Descriptive Statistics 
Table 22. Age: ANOVA and Homogeneity Results 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
1921.949 4 480.487 16.389 .000
Within 
Groups
40399.165 1378 29.317
Total 42321.115 1382
Between 
Groups
1264.184 4 316.046 18.304 .000
Within 
Groups
23793.798 1378 17.267
Total 25057.982 1382
Between 
Groups
53.528 4 13.382 3.361 .010
Within 
Groups
5486.829 1378 3.982
Total 5540.358 1382
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
ANOVA Homogeneity
 
MC 5.426 0.000
RE 5.648 0.000
TG 4.377 0.002
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For the Management Commitment component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3) 
(Table 23) indicated that the composite score for respondents <21 (M = 24.88, SD = 
4.21) was statistically significantly different than all other groups: 21-22 (M = 22.57, SD 
= 5.13), 23-24 (M = 20.73, SD = 5.99), 25-30 (M = 21.04, SD = 5.80), and >30 (M = 
22.52, SD = 5.18). The 21-22 group (M = 22.57, SD = 5.13) composite mean was also 
statistically significantly different from groups 23-24 (M = 20.73, SD = 5.99) and 25-30 
(M = 21.04, SD = 5.80), but no significant difference was found with group >30 (M = 
22.52, SD = 5.18). No significant difference was found between group 23-24 (M = 20.73, 
SD = 5.99) and group 25-30 (M = 21.04, SD = 5.80), but a statistically significant 
difference in means existed with group >30 (M = 22.52, SD = 5.18). Lastly a statistically 
significant difference exists between the 25-30 condition (M = 21.04, SD = 5.80) and the 
>30 condition (M = 22.52, SD = 5.18). 
 
 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
21-22 2.30425 .54075 .000 .7793 3.8292
23-24 4.14720 .55708 .000 2.5774 5.7170
25-30 3.83709 .47657 .000 2.4928 5.1814
>30 2.35687 .44695 .000 1.0941 3.6196
<21 -2.30425 .54075 .000 -3.8292 -.7793
23-24 1.84294 .56334 .012 .2572 3.4287
25-30 1.53284 .48387 .016 .1706 2.8951
>30 .05262 .45473 1.000 -1.2290 1.3342
<21 -4.14720 .55708 .000 -5.7170 -2.5774
21-22 -1.84294 .56334 .012 -3.4287 -.2572
25-30 -.31010 .50205 1.000 -1.7227 1.1025
>30 -1.79033 .47403 .002 -3.1252 -.4555
<21 -3.83709 .47657 .000 -5.1814 -2.4928
21-22 -1.53284 .48387 .016 -2.8951 -.1706
23-24 .31010 .50205 1.000 -1.1025 1.7227
>30 -1.48022 .37614 .001 -2.5360 -.4244
<21 -2.35687 .44695 .000 -3.6196 -1.0941
21-22 -.05262 .45473 1.000 -1.3342 1.2290
23-24 1.79033 .47403 .002 .4555 3.1252
25-30 1.48022 .37614 .001 .4244 2.5360
MC
23-24
25-30
>30
Dunnett 
T3
<21
21-22
  
IntervalDependent Variable (I) Age (J) Age Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
Table 23. Age: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Management Commitment) 
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For the Resources component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3) (Table 24) 
indicated that the composite score for respondents <21 (M = 15.70, SD = 3.42) was 
statistically significantly different than all other groups: 21-22 (M = 14.21, SD = 3.86), 
23-24 (M = 12.84, SD = 4.37), 25-30 (M = 12.69, SD = 4.51), and >30 (M = 12.57, SD = 
4.03). The 21-22 group (M = 22.57, SD = 5.13) composite mean was also statistically 
significantly different from all other conditions, 23-24, 25-30, and >30. Group 23-24 had 
no significant difference in mean score when compared to 25-30, but there was a 
statistically significant difference between all other conditions. Aside from previously 
mentioned differences, the 25-30 and >30 groups had no further statistically significant 
differences.  
 
 
 
 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
21-22 1.48378 .42299 .005 .2907 2.6769
23-24 2.85541 .42842 .000 1.6477 4.0631
25-30 3.00621 .38106 .000 1.9309 4.0815
>30 3.12390 .35862 .000 2.1103 4.1375
<21 -1.48378 .42299 .005 -2.6769 -.2907
23-24 1.37163 .41720 .011 .1972 2.5460
25-30 1.52243 .36840 .000 .4854 2.5595
>30 1.64012 .34515 .000 .6676 2.6127
<21 -2.85541 .42842 .000 -4.0631 -1.6477
21-22 -1.37163 .41720 .011 -2.5460 -.1972
25-30 .15080 .37462 1.000 -.9030 1.2046
>30 .26849 .35178 .997 -.7218 1.2588
<21 -3.00621 .38106 .000 -4.0815 -1.9309
21-22 -1.52243 .36840 .000 -2.5595 -.4854
23-24 -.15080 .37462 1.000 -1.2046 .9030
>30 .11769 .29225 1.000 -.7026 .9380
<21 -3.12390 .35862 .000 -4.1375 -2.1103
21-22 -1.64012 .34515 .000 -2.6127 -.6676
23-24 -.26849 .35178 .997 -1.2588 .7218
25-30 -.11769 .29225 1.000 -.9380 .7026
  
IntervalDependent Variable (I) Age (J) Age Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
RE
25-30
>30
Dunnett 
T3
<21
21-22
23-24
Table 24. Age: Post-Hoc Analysis (Resources) 
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For the Training component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3)(Table 25) 
indicated that the composite score for respondents <21 (M = 13.16, SD = 1.71) was 
statistically significantly different than the 23-24 (M = 12.51, SD = 2.12) treatment. No 
significant difference was discovered in relation to groups 21-22 (M = 12.97, SD = 1.95), 
25-30 (M = 12.69, SD = 2.19), or >30 (M = 12.95, SD = 1.85). Additionally, no 
significant mean differences were revealed amongst other groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25. Age: Post-Hoc Analysis (Training) 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
21-22 .18395 .21293 .992 -.4166 .7845
23-24 .64714 .21144 .024 .0510 1.2433
25-30 .46304 .18897 .139 -.0703 .9964
>30 .20189 .17591 .943 -.2957 .6995
<21 -.18395 .21293 .992 -.7845 .4166
23-24 .46320 .20651 .226 -.1181 1.0445
25-30 .27909 .18343 .746 -.2374 .7955
>30 .01795 .16995 1.000 -.4612 .4971
<21 -.64714 .21144 .024 -1.2433 -.0510
21-22 -.46320 .20651 .226 -1.0445 .1181
25-30 -.18411 .18170 .975 -.6952 .3270
>30 -.44525 .16808 .081 -.9185 .0280
<21 -.46304 .18897 .139 -.9964 .0703
21-22 -.27909 .18343 .746 -.7955 .2374
23-24 .18411 .18170 .975 -.3270 .6952
>30 -.26114 .13876 .461 -.6507 .1284
<21 -.20189 .17591 .943 -.6995 .2957
21-22 -.01795 .16995 1.000 -.4971 .4612
23-24 .44525 .16808 .081 -.0280 .9185
25-30 .26114 .13876 .461 -.1284 .6507
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
Dunnett 
T3
<21
21-22
23-24
25-30
TG
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable (I) Age (J) Age Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
>30
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Time in Career Field 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
seven Time in Career Field conditions on perception of Management Commitment, 
perception of Training, and perception of Resources. The seven groups (see Table 26) 
were sorted as: less than one year (n = 113), 1 to 2 years (n = 254), 3 to 5 years (n = 357), 
6 to 10 years (n = 242), 11 to 15 years (n = 209), 16 to 20 years (n = 133), and greater 
than 20 years (n = 75). There was a statistically significant difference regarding Time in 
Career Field’s effect on all three components: Management Commitment (F= 22.664, p < 
0.001), Resources (F= 16.160, p < 0.001), and Training (F= 4.621, p < 0.001). (Table 27)  
Homogeneity of variance assumptions for Management Commitment (Levene’s 
test: p < .001), Resources (Levene’s test: p < .021), and Training (Levene’s test: p < .001) 
were shaky so both Tukey HSD and Dunnett T3 post hoc tests were conducted with the 
Dunnett T3 used for comparisons.  
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Table 26. Time in Career Field: Composite Score 
Descriptive Statistics 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
<1 113 25.4707 3.93378 .37006 24.7375 26.2039 16.00 30.00
1-2 254 23.3481 5.07235 .31827 22.7213 23.9749 6.00 30.00
3-5 357 20.4130 5.66473 .29981 19.8234 21.0026 6.00 30.00
6-10 242 20.3697 5.65496 .36351 19.6536 21.0857 6.00 30.00
11-15 209 21.9956 5.45343 .37722 21.2520 22.7393 6.00 30.00
16-20 133 22.8724 5.00658 .43413 22.0137 23.7312 7.00 30.00
20+ 75 24.1342 4.71787 .54477 23.0487 25.2197 9.00 30.00
Total 1383 22.0352 5.53381 .14880 21.7433 22.3271 6.00 30.00
<1 113 15.8499 3.38744 .31866 15.2185 16.4813 5.00 20.00
1-2 254 14.3317 4.12355 .25873 13.8221 14.8412 4.00 20.00
3-5 357 12.8232 4.14014 .21912 12.3923 13.2541 4.00 20.00
6-10 242 12.1553 4.41595 .28387 11.5961 12.7144 4.00 20.00
11-15 209 12.3386 4.15026 .28708 11.7727 12.9046 4.00 20.00
16-20 133 12.5110 4.02624 .34912 11.8204 13.2016 4.00 20.00
20+ 75 12.9915 4.18668 .48344 12.0282 13.9548 4.00 20.00
Total 1383 13.1365 4.25813 .11450 12.9119 13.3612 4.00 20.00
<1 113 13.2392 1.67276 .15736 12.9274 13.5510 5.00 15.00
1-2 254 13.0597 1.85562 .11643 12.8304 13.2890 6.00 15.00
3-5 357 12.4955 2.14698 .11363 12.2721 12.7190 4.00 15.00
6-10 242 12.5926 2.22315 .14291 12.3111 12.8742 3.00 15.00
11-15 209 12.9055 1.73136 .11976 12.6694 13.1416 7.00 15.00
16-20 133 12.9634 1.96541 .17042 12.6263 13.3005 3.00 15.00
20+ 75 13.3460 1.94823 .22496 12.8978 13.7943 3.00 15.00
Total 1383 12.8300 2.00223 .05384 12.7244 12.9356 3.00 15.00
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
MC
RE
TG
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Table 27. Time in Career Field: ANOVA and 
Homogeneity Results 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
3806.289 6 634.381 22.664 .000
Within 
Groups
38514.826 1376 27.990
Total 42321.115 1382
Between 
Groups
1649.494 6 274.916 16.160 .000
Within 
Groups
23408.488 1376 17.012
Total 25057.982 1382
Between 
Groups
109.423 6 18.237 4.621 .000
Within 
Groups
5430.935 1376 3.947
Total 5540.358 1382
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
ANOVA Homogeneity
 
MC 4.998 0.000
RE 2.489 0.021
TG 3.786 0.001
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For the Management Commitment component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett 
T3)(see Table 28) indicated that the composite score for respondents with less than one 
year Time in Unit (M = 25.47, SD = 3.93) was statistically significantly different than 
virtually all other groups: 1-2 years (M = 23.35, SD = 5.07), 3-5 years (M = 20.41, SD = 
5.66), 6-10 years (M = 20.37, SD = 5.65), and 11-15 years (M = 22.00, SD = 5.45) and 
16-20 years (M = 22.87, SD = 5.01) The only nonsignificant difference was when 
compared to the over 20 years group (M = 24.13, SD = 4.72). The 1-2 years group also 
shared a statistically significant difference in means with the 3-5 years and 6-10 years 
groups. However, the 3-5 years group and the 6-10 years group have no significant mean 
difference. 3-5 years does have a statistically significant difference in means with all 
other groups. With the exception of 3-5 years, 6-10 years shares a statistically significant 
difference in means with all other conditions. Including aforementioned differences, the 
11-15 years group has a statistically significant difference in means with the over 20 
years group.  
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Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1 - 2 years 2.12262 .48810 .000 .6301 3.6151
3 - 5 years 5.05772 .47627 .000 3.6013 6.5141
6 - 10 years 5.10105 .51874 .000 3.5162 6.6859
11 - 15 years 3.47508 .52843 .000 1.8603 5.0899
16 - 20 years 2.59828 .57045 .000 .8520 4.3445
20+ years 1.33653 .65857 .600 -.6947 3.3677
<1 year -2.12262 .48810 .000 -3.6151 -.6301
3 - 5 years 2.93510 .43724 .000 1.6044 4.2658
6 - 10 years 2.97842 .48315 .000 1.5067 4.4501
11 - 15 years 1.35246 .49355 .125 -.1518 2.8567
16 - 20 years .47566 .53829 1.000 -1.1704 2.1217
20+ years -.78609 .63093 .992 -2.7346 1.1624
<1 year -5.05772 .47627 .000 -6.5141 -3.6013
1 - 2 years -2.93510 .43724 .000 -4.2658 -1.6044
6 - 10 years .04332 .47120 1.000 -1.3915 1.4781
11 - 15 years -1.58265 .48185 .023 -3.0509 -.1144
16 - 20 years -2.45945 .52759 .000 -4.0731 -.8458
20+ years -3.72119 .62182 .000 -5.6432 -1.7992
<1 year -5.10105 .51874 .000 -6.6859 -3.5162
1 - 2 years -2.97842 .48315 .000 -4.4501 -1.5067
3 - 5 years -.04332 .47120 1.000 -1.4781 1.3915
11 - 15 years -1.62597 .52387 .042 -3.2224 -.0296
16 - 20 years -2.50277 .56622 .000 -4.2327 -.7728
20+ years -3.76452 .65492 .000 -5.7827 -1.7463
<1 year -3.47508 .52843 .000 -5.0899 -1.8603
1 - 2 years -1.35246 .49355 .125 -2.8567 .1518
3 - 5 years 1.58265 .48185 .023 .1144 3.0509
6 - 10 years 1.62597 .52387 .042 .0296 3.2224
16 - 20 years -.87680 .57512 .940 -2.6340 .8804
20+ years -2.13855 .66263 .032 -4.1796 -.0975
<1 year -2.59828 .57045 .000 -4.3445 -.8520
1 - 2 years -.47566 .53829 1.000 -2.1217 1.1704
3 - 5 years 2.45945 .52759 .000 .8458 4.0731
6 - 10 years 2.50277 .56622 .000 .7728 4.2327
11 - 15 years .87680 .57512 .940 -.8804 2.6340
20+ years -1.26175 .69659 .779 -3.4049 .8814
<1 year -1.33653 .65857 .600 -3.3677 .6947
1 - 2 years .78609 .63093 .992 -1.1624 2.7346
3 - 5 years 3.72119 .62182 .000 1.7992 5.6432
6 - 10 years 3.76452 .65492 .000 1.7463 5.7827
11 - 15 years 2.13855 .66263 .032 .0975 4.1796
16 - 20 years 1.26175 .69659 .779 -.8814 3.4049
MC
11 - 15 
years
16 - 20 
years
20+ years
Dunnett 
T3
<1 year
1 - 2 years
3 - 5 years
6 - 10 
years
Dependent Variable (I) Year in Career Field (J) Year in Career Field Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
Table 28. Years in Career Field: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Management Commitment) 
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For the Resources component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3)(see Table 29) 
indicated that the composite score for respondents with less than one year Time in Unit 
(M = 15.85, SD = 3.39) was statistically significantly different than all other groups: 1-2 
years (M = 14.33, SD = 4.12), 3-5 years (M = 12.82, SD = 4.14), 6-10 years (M = 12.16, 
SD = 4.42), and 11-15 years (M = 12.34, SD = 4.15) and 16-20 years (M = 12.51, SD = 
4.03), and over 20 years (M = 12.99, SD = 4.19) The only nonsignificant difference was 
when compared to the over 20 years group (M = 24.13, SD = 4.72). The 1-2 years group 
also shared a statistically significant difference in means with the 3-5 years and 6-10 
years groups. However, the 3-5 years group and the 6-10 years group have no significant 
mean difference. 3-5 years does have a statistically significant difference in means with 
all other groups. With the exception of 3-5 years, 6-10 years shares a statistically 
significant difference in means with all other conditions. Including aforementioned 
differences, the 11-15 years group has a statistically significant difference in means with 
the over 20 years group.  
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Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1 - 2 years 1.51821 .41048 .006 .2625 2.7740
3 - 5 years 3.02670 .38673 .000 1.8420 4.2114
6 - 10 3.69462 .42676 .000 2.3899 4.9993
11 - 15 3.51127 .42891 .000 2.1997 4.8228
16 - 20 3.33888 .47268 .000 1.8920 4.7858
20+ years 2.85839 .57901 .000 1.0718 4.6449
<1 year -1.51821 .41048 .006 -2.7740 -.2625
3 - 5 years 1.50849 .33905 .000 .4763 2.5406
6 - 10 2.17640 .38409 .000 1.0065 3.3463
11 - 15 1.99305 .38647 .000 .8153 3.1708
16 - 20 1.82067 .43454 .001 .4920 3.1494
20+ years 1.34018 .54832 .280 -.3557 3.0360
<1 year -3.02670 .38673 .000 -4.2114 -1.8420
1 - 2 years -1.50849 .33905 .000 -2.5406 -.4763
6 - 10 .66792 .35860 .741 -.4242 1.7601
11 - 15 .48457 .36115 .984 -.6161 1.5852
16 - 20 .31218 .41219 1.000 -.9496 1.5740
20+ years -.16831 .53078 1.000 -1.8140 1.4773
<1 year -3.69462 .42676 .000 -4.9993 -2.3899
1 - 2 years -2.17640 .38409 .000 -3.3463 -1.0065
3 - 5 years -.66792 .35860 .741 -1.7601 .4242
11 - 15 -.18335 .40373 1.000 -1.4136 1.0469
16 - 20 -.35573 .44996 1.000 -1.7307 1.0193
20+ years -.83622 .56062 .948 -2.5675 .8951
<1 year -3.51127 .42891 .000 -4.8228 -2.1997
1 - 2 years -1.99305 .38647 .000 -3.1708 -.8153
3 - 5 years -.48457 .36115 .984 -1.5852 .6161
6 - 10 .18335 .40373 1.000 -1.0469 1.4136
16 - 20 -.17238 .45199 1.000 -1.5539 1.2091
20+ years -.65287 .56225 .997 -2.3891 1.0833
<1 year -3.33888 .47268 .000 -4.7858 -1.8920
1 - 2 years -1.82067 .43454 .001 -3.1494 -.4920
3 - 5 years -.31218 .41219 1.000 -1.5740 .9496
6 - 10 .35573 .44996 1.000 -1.0193 1.7307
11 - 15 .17238 .45199 1.000 -1.2091 1.5539
20+ years -.48049 .59632 1.000 -2.3175 1.3565
<1 year -2.85839 .57901 .000 -4.6449 -1.0718
1 - 2 years -1.34018 .54832 .280 -3.0360 .3557
3 - 5 years .16831 .53078 1.000 -1.4773 1.8140
6 - 10 .83622 .56062 .948 -.8951 2.5675
11 - 15 .65287 .56225 .997 -1.0833 2.3891
16 - 20 .48049 .59632 1.000 -1.3565 2.3175
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
RE
Dependent Variable (I) Year in Career Field (J) Year in Career 
Field
11 - 15 
years
16 - 20 
years
20+ years
Dunnett 
T3
<1 year
1 - 2 years
3 - 5 years
6 - 10 
years
Table 29. Years in Career Field: Post-Hoc Analysis (Resources) 
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For the Training component, post hoc comparison (Dunnett T3) (see Table 30) 
indicated that the composite score for respondents with less than 3-5 years’ Time in Unit 
condition (M = 12.50, SD = 2.15) had a statistically significant difference in means when 
compared to the less than 1 year group (M = 13.24, SD = 1.67), the 1-2 years group (M = 
13.06, SD = 1.86), and the 20+ group (M = 13.35, SD = 1.95). No other significant mean 
differences were discovered amongst other groups.  
Table 30. Years in Career Field: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Training) 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1-2 .17946 .19575 1.000 -.4199 .7788
3-5 .74364 .19410 .003 .1494 1.3379
6-10 .64654 .21257 .052 -.0032 1.2963
11-15 .33368 .19775 .863 -.2718 .9392
16-20 .27575 .23196 .996 -.4343 .9858
20+ -.10685 .27454 1.000 -.9533 .7395
<1 -.17946 .19575 1.000 -.7788 .4199
3-5 .56418 .16269 .012 .0691 1.0593
6-10 .46708 .18434 .216 -.0945 1.0286
11-15 .15422 .16703 1.000 -.3547 .6632
16-20 .09630 .20640 1.000 -.5352 .7278
20+ -.28631 .25331 .998 -1.0702 .4975
<1 -.74364 .19410 .003 -1.3379 -.1494
1-2 -.56418 .16269 .012 -1.0593 -.0691
6-10 -.09710 .18258 1.000 -.6531 .4589
11-15 -.40996 .16509 .244 -.9127 .0928
16-20 -.46788 .20483 .384 -1.0946 .1588
20+ -.85049 .25203 .021 -1.6306 -.0704
<1 -.64654 .21257 .052 -1.2963 .0032
1-2 -.46708 .18434 .216 -1.0286 .0945
3-5 .09710 .18258 1.000 -.4589 .6531
11-15 -.31286 .18646 .870 -.8810 .2553
16-20 -.37078 .22241 .876 -1.0503 .3087
20+ -.75339 .26652 .106 -1.5754 .0686
<1 -.33368 .19775 .863 -.9392 .2718
1-2 -.15422 .16703 1.000 -.6632 .3547
3-5 .40996 .16509 .244 -.0928 .9127
6-10 .31286 .18646 .870 -.2553 .8810
16-20 -.05792 .20829 1.000 -.6952 .5794
20+ -.44053 .25485 .835 -1.2289 .3478
<1 -.27575 .23196 .996 -.9858 .4343
1-2 -.09630 .20640 1.000 -.7278 .5352
3-5 .46788 .20483 .384 -.1588 1.0946
6-10 .37078 .22241 .876 -.3087 1.0503
11-15 .05792 .20829 1.000 -.5794 .6952
20+ -.38261 .28223 .980 -1.2515 .4863
<1 .10685 .27454 1.000 -.7395 .9533
1-2 .28631 .25331 .998 -.4975 1.0702
3-5 .85049 .25203 .021 .0704 1.6306
6-10 .75339 .26652 .106 -.0686 1.5754
11-15 .44053 .25485 .835 -.3478 1.2289
16-20 .38261 .28223 .980 -.4863 1.2515
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
Dunnett 
T3
<1
1-2
3-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
20+
TG
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable (I) Year in Career Field (J) Year in Career 
Field
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
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Time in Unit 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of 
nine Time in Unit conditions on perception of Management Commitment, perception of 
Training, and perception of Resources. The nine groups were (see Table 31): less than 
one month (n = 25), 1-3 months (n = 101), 4-6 months (n = 102), 7-12 months (n = 156), 
13-24 months (n = 287), 2-5 years (n = 533), 6-10 years (n = 112), 11-20 years (n = 61), 
and more than 20 years (n = 6). Sample size for the over 20 years’ time in unit group was 
small, but deemed relevant to explore the relationships between new arrivals and the most 
seasoned members. There was a statistically significant difference regarding Time in 
Career Field’s effect on all two components, Management Commitment (F= 12.837, p < 
0.001) and Resources (F= 8.962, p < 0.001), but no between group differences regarding 
Training (F= 1.328, p < .225). (see Table 32)  
Homogeneity of variance assumptions for Management Commitment (Levene’s 
test: p < .064), Resources (Levene’s test: p < .087) were strong, but Training (Levene’s 
test: p < .008) was shaky (see Table 31). Since no inter-group differences were 
discovered for Training, only Tukey’s HSD was utilized for comparisons.  
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Table 31. Time in Unit: Composite Score Descriptive 
Statistics 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
<1 month 25 25.0286 3.40994 .68199 23.6210 26.4362 18.00 30.00
1-3 months 101 24.1234 5.16422 .51386 23.1039 25.1429 6.00 30.00
4-6 months 102 23.5311 4.76261 .47157 22.5956 24.4665 9.00 30.00
7-12 months 156 23.5416 5.32475 .42632 22.6995 24.3838 6.00 30.00
13-24 months 287 22.8251 5.36257 .31654 22.2020 23.4481 6.00 30.00
2-5 years 533 20.6623 5.56366 .24099 20.1889 21.1357 6.00 30.00
6-10 years 112 20.0267 5.30240 .50103 19.0338 21.0195 6.00 30.00
11-20 years 61 22.7442 5.35354 .68545 21.3731 24.1153 10.00 30.00
>20 years 6 24.2813 6.53641 2.66848 17.4217 31.1408 12.00 30.00
Total 1383 22.0352 5.53381 .14880 21.7433 22.3271 6.00 30.00
<1 month 25 15.2376 3.17432 .63486 13.9273 16.5479 7.00 20.00
1-3 months 101 14.7863 3.82498 .38060 14.0312 15.5414 4.00 20.00
4-6 months 102 13.4961 4.39583 .43525 12.6327 14.3595 4.00 20.00
7-12 months 156 14.2581 4.15187 .33242 13.6015 14.9148 4.00 20.00
13-24 months 287 13.7130 4.23832 .25018 13.2206 14.2055 4.00 20.00
2-5 years 533 12.4327 4.24255 .18377 12.0717 12.7937 4.00 20.00
6-10 years 112 11.6881 3.99863 .37784 10.9394 12.4368 4.00 20.00
11-20 years 61 12.3105 3.98454 .51017 11.2900 13.3310 4.00 20.00
>20 years 6 11.7234 3.04427 1.24282 8.5286 14.9182 6.00 14.00
Total 1383 13.1365 4.25813 .11450 12.9119 13.3612 4.00 20.00
<1 month 25 12.9437 1.69443 .33889 12.2443 13.6431 8.00 15.00
1-3 months 101 12.9799 1.85738 .18482 12.6132 13.3465 6.00 15.00
4-6 months 102 12.8871 2.03043 .20104 12.4882 13.2859 5.00 15.00
7-12 months 156 13.0623 1.95525 .15655 12.7530 13.3715 4.00 15.00
13-24 months 287 12.9627 2.04100 .12048 12.7256 13.1999 3.00 15.00
2-5 years 533 12.6656 1.96068 .08493 12.4988 12.8324 4.00 15.00
6-10 years 112 12.5885 2.23656 .21133 12.1697 13.0072 3.00 15.00
11-20 years 61 13.1170 1.67271 .21417 12.6886 13.5454 8.00 15.00
>20 years 6 12.6667 4.80278 1.96073 7.6265 17.7069 3.00 15.00
Total 1383 12.8300 2.00223 .05384 12.7244 12.9356 3.00 15.00
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
MC
RE
TG
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Table 32. Time in Unit: ANOVA and Homogeneity 
Results 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
2943.191 8 367.899 12.837 .000
Within Groups 39377.924 1374 28.659
Total 42321.115 1382
Between 
Groups
1242.719 8 155.340 8.962 .000
Within Groups 23815.263 1374 17.333
Total 25057.982 1382
Between 
Groups
42.522 8 5.315 1.328 .225
Within Groups 5497.836 1374 4.001
Total 5540.358 1382
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
ANOVA Homogeneity
 
MC 1.853 0.064
RE 1.729 0.087
TG 2.592 0.008
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For the Management Commitment component, post hoc comparison (Tukey 
HSD) (see Table 33) indicated that the composite score for conditions 2-5 years (M = 
20.66, SD = 5.56) and 6-10 years (M = 20.03, SD = 5.30) were not significantly different, 
but a statistically significant difference in means exists between both of those conditions 
and the conditions of less than one month (M = 25.03, SD = 3.41), 1-3 months (M = 
24.12, SD = 5.16), 4-6 months (M = 23.53, SD = 4.76), 7-12 months (M = 23.54, SD = 
5.32), and 13-24 months (M = 22.83, SD = 5.36). Additionally, the mean difference is 
statistically significant between 6-10 years and 11-20 years (M = 22.74, SD = 5.35). Post 
hoc tests revealed no significant differences among other groups.  
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Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1 to 3 months .90520 1.19588 .998 -2.8101 4.6205
4 to 6 months 1.49754 1.19472 .944 -2.2141 5.2092
7 - 12 months 1.48697 1.15329 .935 -2.0960 5.0699
13 - 24 months 2.20351 1.11635 .562 -1.2647 5.6717
2 - 5 years 4.36633 1.09551 .002 .9629 7.7698
6 - 10 years 5.00194 1.18417 .001 1.3231 8.6808
11 - 20 years 2.28442 1.27130 .684 -1.6651 6.2340
>20 years .74735 2.43371 1.000 -6.8135 8.3082
<1 month -.90520 1.19588 .998 -4.6205 2.8101
4 to 6 months .59233 .75148 .997 -1.7423 2.9270
7 - 12 months .58176 .68372 .995 -1.5423 2.7059
13 - 24 months 1.29831 .61937 .476 -.6259 3.2225
2 - 5 years 3.46113 .58097 .000 1.6562 5.2660
6 - 10 years 4.09674 .73460 .000 1.8145 6.3789
11 - 20 years 1.37922 .86809 .811 -1.3177 4.0761
>20 years -.15786 2.24951 1.000 -7.1464 6.8307
<1 month -1.49754 1.19472 .944 -5.2092 2.2141
1 to 3 months -.59233 .75148 .997 -2.9270 1.7423
7 - 12 months -.01057 .68168 1.000 -2.1284 2.1072
13 - 24 months .70598 .61712 .967 -1.2112 2.6232
2 - 5 years 2.86880 .57857 .000 1.0713 4.6663
6 - 10 years 3.50440 .73271 .000 1.2281 5.7807
11 - 20 years .78689 .86649 .993 -1.9050 3.4788
>20 years -.75019 2.24890 1.000 -7.7369 6.2365
<1 month -1.48697 1.15329 .935 -5.0699 2.0960
1 to 3 months -.58176 .68372 .995 -2.7059 1.5423
4 to 6 months .01057 .68168 1.000 -2.1072 2.1284
13 - 24 months .71655 .53251 .917 -.9378 2.3709
2 - 5 years 2.87937 .48732 .000 1.3654 4.3933
6 - 10 years 3.51497 .66302 .000 1.4552 5.5748
11 - 20 years .79745 .80842 .987 -1.7141 3.3090
>20 years -.73962 2.22717 1.000 -7.6588 6.1795
<1 month -2.20351 1.11635 .562 -5.6717 1.2647
1 to 3 months -1.29831 .61937 .476 -3.2225 .6259
4 to 6 months -.70598 .61712 .967 -2.6232 1.2112
7 - 12 months -.71655 .53251 .917 -2.3709 .9378
2 - 5 years 2.16282 .39195 .000 .9451 3.3805
6 - 10 years 2.79843 .59644 .000 .9454 4.6514
11 - 20 years .08091 .75477 1.000 -2.2640 2.4258
>20 years -1.45617 2.20826 .999 -8.3166 5.4043
<1 month -4.36633 1.09551 .002 -7.7698 -.9629
1 to 3 months -3.46113 .58097 .000 -5.2660 -1.6562
4 to 6 months -2.86880 .57857 .000 -4.6663 -1.0713
7 - 12 months -2.87937 .48732 .000 -4.3933 -1.3654
13 - 24 months -2.16282 .39195 .000 -3.3805 -.9451
6 - 10 years .63560 .55647 .968 -1.0932 2.3644
11 - 20 years -2.08191 .72360 .095 -4.3299 .1661
>20 years -3.61899 2.19780 .779 -10.4469 3.2089
<1 month -5.00194 1.18417 .001 -8.6808 -1.3231
1 to 3 months -4.09674 .73460 .000 -6.3789 -1.8145
4 to 6 months -3.50440 .73271 .000 -5.7807 -1.2281
7 - 12 months -3.51497 .66302 .000 -5.5748 -1.4552
13 - 24 months -2.79843 .59644 .000 -4.6514 -.9454
2 - 5 years -.63560 .55647 .968 -2.3644 1.0932
11 - 20 years -2.71752 .85189 .039 -5.3641 -.0710
>20 years -4.25459 2.24331 .616 -11.2239 2.7147
<1 month -2.28442 1.27130 .684 -6.2340 1.6651
1 to 3 months -1.37922 .86809 .811 -4.0761 1.3177
4 to 6 months -.78689 .86649 .993 -3.4788 1.9050
7 - 12 months -.79745 .80842 .987 -3.3090 1.7141
13 - 24 months -.08091 .75477 1.000 -2.4258 2.2640
2 - 5 years 2.08191 .72360 .095 -.1661 4.3299
6 - 10 years 2.71752 .85189 .039 .0710 5.3641
>20 years -1.53707 2.29050 .999 -8.6530 5.5788
<1 month -.74735 2.43371 1.000 -8.3082 6.8135
1 to 3 months .15786 2.24951 1.000 -6.8307 7.1464
4 to 6 months .75019 2.24890 1.000 -6.2365 7.7369
7 - 12 months .73962 2.22717 1.000 -6.1795 7.6588
13 - 24 months 1.45617 2.20826 .999 -5.4043 8.3166
2 - 5 years 3.61899 2.19780 .779 -3.2089 10.4469
6 - 10 years 4.25459 2.24331 .616 -2.7147 11.2239
11 - 20 years 1.53707 2.29050 .999 -5.5788 8.6530
MC
>20 years
Tukey 
HSD
<1 month
1 to 3 months
4 to 6 months
7 - 12 months
13 - 24 months
2 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 20 years
Dependent Variable (I) Time in Unit (J) Time in Unit Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
  
Interval
Table 33. Time in Unit: Post-Hoc Analysis (Management 
Commitment) 
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For the Resources component, post hoc comparison (Tukey HSD) (see Table 34) 
indicated that the composite score for respondents differed with statistical significance 
between 6-10 years (M = 11.69, SD = 4.00) and less than one month (M = 15.24, SD = 
3.17), 1-3 months (M = 14.79, SD = 3.82), 4-6 months (M = 13.50, SD = 4.40), 7-12 
months (M = 14.26, SD = 4.15), and 13-24 months (M = 13.71, SD = 4.24). 2-5 years (M 
= 12.43, SD = 4.24) mean composite score difference was statistically significant for the 
same groups with the exception of 4-6 months. The 1-3 month group was also 
statistically different from the 11-20 years group (M = 12.31, SD = 3.98). The only group 
with so significant intergroup differences was the greater than 20 years group (M = 
11.72, SD = 3.04) 
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Table 34. Time in Unit: Post-Hoc Analysis 
(Resources) 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1-3 .45135 .93001 1.000 -2.4379 3.3406
4-6 
th
1.74152 .92911 .632 -1.1449 4.6280
7-12 .97952 .89689 .975 -1.8069 3.7659
13-24 
th
1.52460 .86816 .711 -1.1725 4.2217
2-5 years 2.80497 .85196 .028 .1582 5.4518
6-10 years 3.54957 .92091 .004 .6886 6.4106
11-20 2.92712 .98866 .076 -.1444 5.9986
>20 years 3.51423 1.89265 .644 -2.3657 9.3941
<1 month -.45135 .93001 1.000 -3.3406 2.4379
4-6 1.29017 .58442 .401 -.5254 3.1058
7-12 
th
.52817 .53171 .987 -1.1237 2.1800
13-24 1.07325 .48167 .388 -.4232 2.5697
2-5 years 2.35362 .45181 .000 .9500 3.7573
6-10 years 3.09822 .57129 .000 1.3234 4.8730
11-20 2.47577 .67510 .008 .3784 4.5731
>20 years 3.06288 1.74940 .715 -2.3720 8.4978
<1 month -1.74152 .92911 .632 -4.6280 1.1449
1-3 -1.29017 .58442 .401 -3.1058 .5254
7-12 -.76200 .53013 .883 -2.4090 .8850
13-24 
th
-.21692 .47992 1.000 -1.7079 1.2740
2-5 years 1.06345 .44994 .305 -.3344 2.4613
6-10 years 1.80805 .56981 .041 .0378 3.5783
11-20 1.18560 .67385 .709 -.9079 3.2791
>20 years 1.77271 1.74892 .985 -3.6607 7.2061
<1 month -.97952 .89689 .975 -3.7659 1.8069
1-3 
th
-.52817 .53171 .987 -2.1800 1.1237
4-6 .76200 .53013 .883 -.8850 2.4090
13-24 
th
.54508 .41413 .927 -.7415 1.8317
2-5 years 1.82545 .37898 .000 .6481 3.0028
6-10 years 2.57005 .51562 .000 .9682 4.1719
11-20 1.94760 .62869 .051 -.0056 3.9008
>20 years 2.53471 1.73202 .872 -2.8462 7.9156
<1 month -1.52460 .86816 .711 -4.2217 1.1725
1-3 -1.07325 .48167 .388 -2.5697 .4232
4-6 
th
.21692 .47992 1.000 -1.2740 1.7079
7-12 -.54508 .41413 .927 -1.8317 .7415
2-5 years 1.28037 .30482 .001 .3334 2.2273
6-10 years 2.02497 .46384 .000 .5839 3.4660
11-20 1.40252 .58697 .290 -.4210 3.2261
>20 years 1.98963 1.71732 .965 -3.3456 7.3249
<1 month -2.80497 .85196 .028 -5.4518 -.1582
1-3 -2.35362 .45181 .000 -3.7573 -.9500
4-6 
th
-1.06345 .44994 .305 -2.4613 .3344
7-12 -1.82545 .37898 .000 -3.0028 -.6481
13-24 -1.28037 .30482 .001 -2.2273 -.3334
6-10 years .74460 .43275 .734 -.5998 2.0890
11-20 .12215 .56273 1.000 -1.6261 1.8704
>20 years .70926 1.70919 1.000 -4.6007 6.0192
<1 month -3.54957 .92091 .004 -6.4106 -.6886
1-3 
th
-3.09822 .57129 .000 -4.8730 -1.3234
4-6 -1.80805 .56981 .041 -3.5783 -.0378
7-12 
th
-2.57005 .51562 .000 -4.1719 -.9682
13-24 -2.02497 .46384 .000 -3.4660 -.5839
2-5 years -.74460 .43275 .734 -2.0890 .5998
11-20 -.62245 .66250 .991 -2.6806 1.4357
>20 years -.03534 1.74458 1.000 -5.4552 5.3846
<1 month -2.92712 .98866 .076 -5.9986 .1444
1-3 -2.47577 .67510 .008 -4.5731 -.3784
4-6 
th
-1.18560 .67385 .709 -3.2791 .9079
7-12 -1.94760 .62869 .051 -3.9008 .0056
13-24 
th
-1.40252 .58697 .290 -3.2261 .4210
2-5 years -.12215 .56273 1.000 -1.8704 1.6261
6-10 years .62245 .66250 .991 -1.4357 2.6806
>20 years .58711 1.78128 1.000 -4.9468 6.1210
<1 month -3.51423 1.89265 .644 -9.3941 2.3657
1-3 -3.06288 1.74940 .715 -8.4978 2.3720
4-6 
th
-1.77271 1.74892 .985 -7.2061 3.6607
7-12 
th
-2.53471 1.73202 .872 -7.9156 2.8462
13-24 -1.98963 1.71732 .965 -7.3249 3.3456
2-5 years -.70926 1.70919 1.000 -6.0192 4.6007
6-10 years .03534 1.74458 1.000 -5.3846 5.4552
11-20 -.58711 1.78128 1.000 -6.1210 4.9468
Note : MC - Management Commitment, RE - Resources, TG - Training
2-5 years
Tukey 
HSD
<1 month
1-3 
months
4-6 
months
7-12 
months
13-24 
months
RE
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable (I) Time in Unit (J) Time in Unit Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
6-10 years
11-20 
years
>20 years
  
Interval
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Date Completed 
 In an attempt to identify a trend in safety climate in relation to time, respondents 
were grouped by date that the survey was taken. This analysis was conducted in two 
forms. The first analysis was performed by forming four groups related to the year in 
which the survey was taken (see Table 35): 2013 (n = 320), 2014 (n = 339), 2015 (n = 
393), and 2016 (n = 327). This analysis showed no significant difference between groups 
regarding Management Commitment (F = .552, p < .647), Resources (F = .159, p < .846), 
or Training (F = .108, p < .956) (see Table 36) 
 
  
 
 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
2013 320 12.8560 1.97751 .11055 12.6385 13.0735 4.00 15.00
2014 339 12.8619 2.09402 .11373 12.6382 13.0856 3.00 15.00
2015 393 12.7933 1.92790 .09725 12.6021 12.9845 3.00 15.00
2016 327 12.8042 2.03223 .11238 12.5831 13.0253 3.00 15.00
Total 1379 12.8273 2.00403 .05397 12.7214 12.9332 3.00 15.00
2013 320 13.4770 4.39918 .24592 12.9931 13.9608 4.00 20.00
2014 339 12.7291 4.27298 .23208 12.2726 13.1856 4.00 20.00
2015 393 13.1782 4.14796 .20924 12.7668 13.5895 4.00 20.00
2016 327 13.1519 4.22932 .23388 12.6918 13.6120 4.00 20.00
Total 1379 13.1309 4.26062 .11473 12.9058 13.3560 4.00 20.00
2013 320 21.7795 6.09599 .34078 21.1090 22.4499 6.00 30.00
2014 339 22.3068 5.54510 .30117 21.7144 22.8992 6.00 30.00
2015 393 21.9340 5.18111 .26135 21.4202 22.4478 6.00 30.00
2016 327 22.0893 5.38088 .29756 21.5039 22.6747 7.00 30.00
Total 1379 22.0266 5.53783 .14913 21.7341 22.3192 6.00 30.00
Training
Resource
s
Managem
ent
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Table 35. Year Completed: Composite 
Score Descriptive Statistics 
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A second attempt was made to discover differences by further dividing the data 
by quarters. Nine distinct groups were identified (see Table 37): 3rd Quarter 2013 (n= 
281), 4th Quarter 2013 (n = 39), 1st Quarter 2014 (n = 8), 3rd Quarter 2014 (n = 233), 4th 
Quarter 2014 (n = 98), 3rd Quarter 2015 (n = 393), 2nd Quarter 2016 (n = 10), 3rd Quarter 
2016 (n = 73), and 4th Quarter 2016 (n = 244). This analysis showed no significant 
difference between groups regarding Management Commitment (F = 1.167, p < .315), 
Resources (F = 1.633, p < .111), or Training (F = .523, p < .840) ) (see Table 38) 
 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
1.298 3 .433 .108 .956
Within 
Groups
5532.914 1375 4.024
Total 5534.212 1378
Between 
Groups
94.072 3 31.357 1.730 .159
Within 
Groups
24920.634 1375 18.124
Total 25014.706 1378
Between 
Groups
50.823 3 16.941 .552 .647
Within 
Groups
42209.030 1375 30.697
Total 42259.853 1378
Homogeneity
1.213 0.304
0.272 0.846
3.772 0.010
ANOVA
 
Training
Resource
s
Managem
ent
Table 36. Year Completed: ANOVA and 
Homogeneity Results 
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Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Levene 
Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
16.839 8 2.105 .523 .840
Within 
Groups
5517.373 1370 4.027
Total 5534.212 1378
Between 
Groups
236.325 8 29.541 1.633 .111
Within 
Groups
24778.382 1370 18.086
Total 25014.706 1378
Between 
Groups
286.097 8 35.762 1.167 .315
Within 
Groups
41973.756 1370 30.638
Total 42259.853 1378
Homogeneity
1.752 0.082
0.562 0.810
1.783 0.076
ANOVA
 
Training
Resource
s
Managem
ent
Table 38. Quarter Completed: ANOVA 
and Homogeneity Results 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
3Q 2013 281 12.9190 1.96323 .11712 12.6885 13.1496 4.00 15.00
4Q 2013 39 12.4021 2.04631 .32767 11.7387 13.0654 8.00 15.00
1Q 2014 8 12.1250 3.44083 1.21652 9.2484 15.0016 6.00 15.00
3Q 2014 233 12.9124 1.97364 .12930 12.6577 13.1672 3.00 15.00
4Q 2014 98 12.8020 2.24811 .22709 12.3512 13.2527 6.00 15.00
3Q 2015 393 12.7933 1.92790 .09725 12.6021 12.9845 3.00 15.00
2Q 2016 10 13.1227 2.07177 .65515 11.6407 14.6048 8.23 15.00
3Q 2016 73 12.8176 2.15936 .25273 12.3137 13.3214 6.00 15.00
4Q 2016 244 12.7871 1.99888 .12797 12.5351 13.0392 3.00 15.00
Total 1379 12.8273 2.00403 .05397 12.7214 12.9332 3.00 15.00
3Q 2013 281 13.5981 4.42329 .26387 13.0787 14.1175 4.00 20.00
4Q 2013 39 12.6039 4.17184 .66803 11.2516 13.9563 4.00 20.00
1Q 2014 8 15.0000 4.27618 1.51186 11.4250 18.5750 9.00 20.00
3Q 2014 233 12.8091 4.28372 .28064 12.2562 13.3620 4.00 20.00
4Q 2014 98 12.3535 4.22252 .42654 11.5069 13.2001 4.00 20.00
3Q 2015 393 13.1782 4.14796 .20924 12.7668 13.5895 4.00 20.00
2Q 2016 10 10.9340 5.69318 1.80034 6.8614 15.0067 4.00 20.00
3Q 2016 73 13.1148 4.04258 .47315 12.1716 14.0580 4.00 20.00
4Q 2016 244 13.2539 4.21198 .26964 12.7228 13.7851 4.00 20.00
Total 1379 13.1309 4.26062 .11473 12.9058 13.3560 4.00 20.00
3Q 2013 281 22.0727 6.06203 .36163 21.3608 22.7845 6.00 30.00
4Q 2013 39 19.6667 5.99708 .96030 17.7226 21.6107 6.00 30.00
1Q 2014 8 23.7500 5.77556 2.04197 18.9215 28.5785 14.00 30.00
3Q 2014 233 22.2818 5.52211 .36177 21.5691 22.9946 6.00 30.00
4Q 2014 98 22.2484 5.62367 .56808 21.1210 23.3759 6.00 30.00
3Q 2015 393 21.9340 5.18111 .26135 21.4202 22.4478 6.00 30.00
2Q 2016 10 23.1375 6.94628 2.19661 18.1684 28.1066 9.00 30.00
3Q 2016 73 22.3564 4.86788 .56974 21.2207 23.4922 8.00 30.00
4Q 2016 244 21.9664 5.47298 .35037 21.2763 22.6566 7.00 30.00
Total 1379 22.0266 5.53783 .14913 21.7341 22.3192 6.00 30.00
Minimum Maximum
Training
Resources
Management
 
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
  
Interval for Mean
Table 37. Quarter Completed: Composite 
Score Descriptive Statistics 
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V Discussion 
 
Overview 
 This final chapter will discuss the findings of this research and how those findings 
relate to the proposed research question. Investigative Question 1 will be answered by a 
brief discussion of EFA findings regarding the underlying structure of the AFCMRS 
survey. Investigative Question 2 will be answered by reviewing survey demographics and 
data used for trend analysis. Investigative Question 3 will be answered by translating one-
way analysis of variance findings into existing trends within analyzed variables. 
Ultimately, the implications of research findings will be discussed, and future research 
proposed. 
IQ1  
What coherent safety climate (or other) constructs exist within the current nuclear 
maintenance Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System survey data? 
 Exploratory Factor analysis indicated that three distinct factors existed in the 
underlying survey structure: Management Commitment, Resources, and Training. 
Internal consistency was validated using Cronbach’s alpha with all factors exceeding the 
recommended minimum of .70: .906 for Management Commitment (6 items), .905 for 
Resources (4 items), and .720 for Training (3 items). 
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IQ2 
What group variables exist, within the existing survey, which may provide a basis for 
analysis of safety trends within the nuclear maintenance enterprise? 
 Seven variables existed within the survey that proved suitable for means testing in 
search of trends, differences and similarities: Date Survey Completed, Rank, Missile 
Field Deployer Status, Age, Time in Career Field, Time in Unit, and Primary Weapon 
System. 
  
IQ3 
What trends, differences, or similarities, exist among the identified constructs and 
variables that may highlight existing trends useful for leadership situational awareness 
and decision making? 
 Notable differences existed within the variables of Rank, Age, Time in Career 
Field, and Time in Unit across all composite scores for Management  
Discussion 
“A survey can act as a basic intervention by leadership” (Carroll, 1998). While 
this statement may be true, why stop at a basic intervention when a survey can prove to 
be a valuable resource for leadership? This research uncovered three factors within the 
AFCMRS survey that can directly be attributed to, and measure, safety climate. With 
research supporting a correlation between safety climate and safety outcome (Choudhry 
et al., 2009; Morrow et al., 2014) the ability to measure safety climate can provide a 
potential predictive measure that leadership can use to reduce negative safety outcomes. 
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While this research stopped short of pontificating on the predictive possibilities of the 
measure, current trends and similarities were discovered that provide useful data to 
leaders at all levels.  
Commitment, Resources, and Training. Similarities existed in group composite 
score comparisons for Missile Field Deployer Status and Primary Weapon system (with 
the exception of ICBM compared to Other perception of Resources). Potential trends 
were found when comparing perceptions of Management Commitment, Resources, and 
Training between groups for the variables of Rank, Age, Time in Unit, and Time in 
Career Field. 
One notable similarity existed between groups for the Date Survey Taken 
variable. Analysis of variance between means for both “year taken” and “quarter taken” 
uncovered no significant difference in perception for all three factors. The data supports a 
level and unchanging view of safety (for better or worse) across four years of responses. 
Even with initiatives and commanders changing frequently throughout the data 
timeframe, it seems no positive or negative changes for safety climate existed. 
Existing trends like this can inform commanders about how to appropriate time 
and effort to safety issues. For example, variations in perception across Rank, Age, Time 
in Unit, Time in Career Field created some unexpected trends. Examples of groups with 
statistically significant mean differences are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Mean Plot for Perception of Training across 
Age Groups 
Figure 3. Mean Plot for Perception of Training across Years in Career 
Field Groups 
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The aforementioned variations support Slocum and Cron’s (1985) findings 
regarding career stage theory. This theory, originally proposed by Donald E. Super 
(1958), suggests that three different career stages exists (Trial Stage, Maintenance Stage, 
and Stabilization Stage) and that employees at each career stage exhibits different 
tendencies (Slocum & Cron, 1985). Slocum and Cron’s study (1985) positively supported 
Super’s theory by finding career stage impacts attitudes and job behaviors while also 
postulating that person’s in the trial stage (finding occupation and lifestyle satisfactory) 
are more likely to identify with the organization ( Super, 1958 as cited by Slocum & 
Cron, 1985). When applied to the group variances discovered through ANOVA in the 
current study, the results suggest that the younger respondents (In Rank, Time in Career 
Field, Time in Unit, and Age) may be experiencing a similar phenomenon. Having just 
starting their career and having an obligation to serve a perfunctory period may increase 
their perceptions of Safety Climate merely due to their career stage.  
While career stage theory explains differing perceptions among stages, combining 
relevant groups may assist in explaining trends within the data. While Rank, Age, and 
Time in Career were analyzed separately, they represent distinct groups within the 
maintenance community. For airmen, the ranks E1 through E3 are typically 18-21 years 
old and have less than three years’ time in unit. At this stage in an airman’s career the 
youngest have just graduated their respective technical training and have joined their first 
maintenance organization. On the opposite end of this group are airmen that are 
completing on the job training and becoming experts in their craft. These personnel are 
solely focused on perfecting their skills and are generally unconcerned with issues 
outside of that scope. This group of personnel is also under the first contractual obligation 
73 
 
(three or six years) and is unable to search for alternate careers in the private sector. The 
status quo, coupled with pay and benefits, satisfies the youngest respondents. From a 
trend standpoint, perception of Management Commitment, Training, and Resources 
began to drop sharply as respondents progressed in rank, age, and experience. 
The next career stage for enlisted personnel in the maintenance community 
combines two Year in Career groups (3-5, 6-10 years), one Rank group (E4-E6), and two 
Age groups (23-24 and 25-30), essentially representing the Noncommissioned Officer 
(NCO) demographic. Within this range, personnel enter the phase where they supervise 
personnel and portions of maintenance. Beginning as Team Chiefs and progressing to 
jobs such as Critical Task Supervisor, Site Supervisor, and Bay Chief, this personnel 
group experiences an increased load of responsibility. Instead of focusing simply on task 
performance they must now concern themselves with supervising subordinates, 
administrative issues (i.e. performance reports), and other non-maintenance activities (i.e. 
professional military education and additional duties).  
In addition to this change in responsibility level, workers within this range are 
also completing their first contractual obligation and considering their career prospects 
and future. Coupled with the increased workload, these decisions arguably add additional 
pressure to the new supervisors. While these stressors can affect the ultimate perceptions 
of safety for NCOs (perceptions were statistically significantly different from both E1-E3 
and E7-E8), it must also be assumed that, as first line supervisors, the E4-E6 group is in 
the best position to judge safety within the organization. Unlike the E7-E8, E9, and O4-
O5 groups, the E4-E6 group directly performs and supervises maintenance actions. Due 
to their direct contact with younger airmen and exposure to maintenance activities, this 
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group’s perceptions must be strongly considered when measuring safety climate. The 
large disparity that exists between the first line supervision group and older management 
groups responsible for policy, resources, and training decisions is cause for concern.  
The third enlisted group, Senior Noncommissioned Officers (SNCO) (E7-E8), 
aligns with the over 30 years old age group and 11-20 years’ time in career field groups 
(a combination of 11-15 years and 16-20 years). As the enlisted group in  management 
positions (leading sections, flights, and squadrons), this group is explicitly tasked with 
performing all three discovered components: managing personnel, training their 
subordinates, and appropriately allocating resources for mission accomplishment (USAF, 
2009). With the group responsible for these functions partaking in the survey, they are 
essentially rating themselves. This would explain why these groups rated Management 
Commitment, Training, and Resources higher than first line supervisors. This is 
especially evident when comparing perception of Training across years in career field 
(see Figure 4). As groups advance in years, so does their portion of responsibility for the 
three constructs discovered through this research. Data shows that composite scores for 
managers are higher than that of their subordinates, especially for Management 
Commitment and Training.  
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The highest- level managers within the study consists of the Rank group O4-O5. 
Also known as Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, this group comprises squadron-level 
leadership. As Operations Officers and Squadron Commanders, this group is ultimately 
responsible for organization direction and mission accomplishment. More so than the 
SNCO group, they are tasked with managing the three components and, as such, the 
composite scores rise even further. O4-O5 groups rated perceptions exceptionally higher 
when compared to those actively engaged with safety in the work area.  The imbalance 
between O4-O5 and E4-E6 is at its greatest for the Management Commitment factors 
(see Figure 5) but also exists for the Training factor (see Figure 6). Resources remains the 
only factor where the two groups do not significantly differ (see Figure 7), and this 
similarity is equally insightful. 
 
Figure 4. Mean Plot for Perception of Training 
Across Year in Career Field Groups 
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Figure 5. Mean Plot for Perception of Management 
Commitment Across Rank Groups 
Figure 6. Mean Plot for Perception of 
Training across Rank Groups 
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 Perception of adequate resources is a frequent complaint within the Air Force. As 
resources are finite, it is not uncommon to blame lack of adequate resources for mission 
impediment. Having a maintenance background, the author has experienced countless 
meetings where lack of resources, a measure arguably beyond local control, is the culprit 
for mishaps. The composite score for Resources was inversely related to how old the 
respondents were (see Figure 8) and how long they had spent in the unit (see Figure 9). 
This negative trend supports the idea that leadership treats lack of resources as the 
offender as opposed to Management Commitment or Training. While this could be 
factual, conjecture could be made that leadership shifts responsibility by focusing on a 
construct beyond their control instead of accepting personal responsibility for safety 
climate.   
Figure 7. Mean Plot for Perception of 
Resources across Rank Groups 
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 Contrasting the findings of time-based variables, perceptions across weapon 
systems was stable with perception of resources identified as an outlier. When ICBM, 
Bomber, and Other were compared only the ICBM group and Other group differed with 
statistical significance. While recent incidents highlighted glaring safety issues within the 
nuclear enterprise, data does not appear to support a large disparity between perceptions.  
Figure 8. Mean Plot for Perception of 
Resources across Age Groups 
Figure 9. Mean Plot for Perception of Resources 
across Time in Unit Groups 
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Implications 
 The data gathered, analyzed and discussed ultimately answered the overall 
research question for this thesis. Knowing that three factors (with appropriate 
psychometric properties) exist within the AFCMRS survey data allows for a more 
thorough understanding of the results. Ultimately, a disconnect exists between leadership 
and the ranks performing hands on maintenance. This disparity may exist due to 
leadership being disconnected from day-to-day maintenance activities or it may exist 
because first-line supervisors are simply discontent with the requirements levied upon 
them. No matter the reasoning, the ultimate implication of this study is that leadership at 
all levels can be made aware of this trend.  
 With respect to resources, time, and initiatives the most progress may be made by 
focusing safety initiatives on the following groups: E4-E6, 23-24 years old, 3-10 years in 
career field, or 6-10 years’ time in unit as they are the groups with the lowest composite 
scores across all constructs. Instead of a blanket approach to safety, emphasis can be 
placed in specific areas where it may prove to have the largest impact. More importantly, 
it isn’t blanket safety talks that will improve climate. To improve perceptions, leaders 
will need to improve Management Commitment, Training, and Resources. 
From the author’s professional experience, Management Commitment, Training, 
and Resources tend to go hand-in-hand within a maintenance unit. If first-line supervisors 
don’t feel properly supported with resources and training, perception of management 
commitment will ultimately suffer the consequences. This research identified a 
disillusioned group within the nuclear enterprise as opposed to simply comparing mean 
scores against other units. 
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 With respect to weapon systems, virtually no differences were noted between 
weapon systems or missile field deployment status. While this may seem unexpected 
(since SECDEF-directed inquiries agreed with Burns & Baldor (2014) that missile field 
deployers reported higher levels of career dissatisfaction), responses between ICBM, 
Bomber, and Other career fields were not significantly different in respect to Training 
and Management commitment. The exception was the perception of Resources and this 
issue may be rectified by the increase in manning, spending, and improvement efforts 
instituted by SECDEF Hagel. Analysis of future survey responses utilizing this research’s 
proposed three factor structure will identify whether these changes have any effect on 
measured perceptions on future surveys. 
 While current AFCMRS survey data can be measured and compared to sister 
squadrons, the owning command, and the Air Force as a whole, the measurement is not 
effective and the survey structure must be addressed. Ultimately, using statistical 
analysis, this study identified underlying trends worth noting that do not present under 
the current process. The most glaring finding is that a large disparity exists between 
leadership groups (O4-O5 ranks, 20+ years’ time in career field , and over 30 years of 
age) and groups performing and directly supervising maintenance (E4-E5, 3-10 years’ 
time in career, and 23-24 years of age). While only anecdotal attempts can be made to 
explain this difference it is vital to address.  
 
 
 
Limitations 
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 One limitation for this study revolved around data cleansing prior to performing 
Exploratory Factor Analysis. On 30 July 2013, the Air Force Safety Center released a 
change to the survey’s structure (rewording 19 questions and adding the variable of 
Missile Field Deployer Status). Due to this change, 9,787 survey responses were 
eliminated from inclusion within this research. While the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy of .947 proved sample size more than adequate, survey 
demographics were drastically altered between the original survey demographics and the 
sample demographics utilized for analysis. Table 39 provides a comparison of original 
demographics to analyzed demographics.  
 For analysis, 20% of post-change survey responses were randomly selected. With 
the survey change, missing data removal, and uniform responses removed the 
representation of demographic groups was altered. Demographic changes to note (>1.5% 
change) include: 
- E1-E3 was decreased from 23.4% to 21.3% 
- E7-E8 was increased from 9.6% to 11.2% 
- 1 to 3 months’ time in unit increased from 3.1% to 7.3% 
- 4 to 6 months’ time in unit increased from 3.0% to 7.4% 
- 7 to 12 months’ time in unit decreased from 13.1% to 11.3% 
- 13 to 24 months’ time in unit decreased from 22.5% to 20.8% 
- 2 to 5 years’ time in unit increased from 36.5% to 38.5% 
- Greater than 20 years’ time in unit decreased from 7.1% to 0.4% 
- 21-22 years of age decreased from 15.3% to 12.7% 
82 
 
- Over 30 years of age increased from 30.2% to 34.1% 
While all statistical tests still support the adequacy of the findings, the demographics 
have changed and as such, need to be stated. Without questionnaire changes, future 
research may be able to provide a more accurate population sample post-conditioning.  
 
 
Another limitation of this study is the original survey formatting and item content. 
The AFCMRS survey data is meant to be aligned with the HFACS model (AFSEC, n.d.-
a) and relies on that model for question separation. The survey structure does not support 
this intent, instead, separating survey items into three subgroups to measure tier one and a 
fourth subgroup measuring all three tier two dimensions as a single dimension. Along 
Table 39. Analysis Demographics In 
Comparison to Original Population 
Frequency 
(n)
Original 
Sample %
Analysis 
sample % Frequency
Original 
Sample %
Analysis 
sample %
E1-E3 294 23.4% 21.3% <1 113 8.8% 8.2%
E4-E6 836 59.3% 60.4% 1-2 254 19.6% 18.4%
E7-E8 155 9.6% 11.2% 3-5 357 25.0% 25.8%
E9 15 0.9% 1.1% 6-10 242 19.5% 17.5%
O1-O3 40 2.4% 2.9% 11-15 209 12.9% 15.1%
O4-O5 13 0.9% 0.9% 16-20 133 8.1% 9.6%
Other 30 3.5% 2.2% 20+ 75 6.2% 5.4%
Frequency Original Sample %
Analysis 
sample % Frequency
Original 
Sample %
Analysis 
sample %
Yes 190 6.8% 13.7% ICBM 377 28.6% 27.3%
No 1193 37.8% 86.3% Bomber 877 56.9% 63.4%
Other 129 14.5% 9.3%
Frequency Original Sample %
Analysis 
sample %
<1 month 25 2.8% 1.8% Frequency Original Sample %
Analysis 
sample %
1 to 3 months 101 3.1% 7.3% <21 124 9.9% 9.0%
4 to 6 months 102 3.0% 7.4% 21-22 176 15.3% 12.7%
 to 12 month 156 13.1% 11.3% 23-24 214 15.4% 15.5%
3 to 24 month 287 22.5% 20.8% 25-30 398 29.2% 28.8%
2 to 5 years 533 36.5% 38.5% >30 471 30.2% 34.1%
6 to 10 years 112 8.8% 8.1%
11 to 20 years 61 3.2% 4.4%
> 20 years 6 7.1% 0.4%
Note: Demographics represent 
AFCMRS Survey respondents that were 
randomly chosen for analysis.
Missile Field Deployer
Time in Unit
Primary Weapon 
System
Rank
Age (years)
Time in Career (years)
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with flawed structure, item wording was inadequate. 31 survey items were worded so as 
to measure multiple concepts. For example, question 40 (“I am provided adequate 
resources (e.g. time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to accomplish my job) asks 
respondents to provide one answer covering four facets of resources.  
Statistically, EFA supports three factors and associated items, but 50 survey items 
were eliminated due to lack of psychometric adequacy. Elimination of questions due to 
wording and lack of cohesive constructs limits the ability to test for other important 
factors. With safety climate research supporting a plethora of alternate dimensions, better 
wording and organization of questions could lead to more identified factors and trends. 
 
Future Research 
 With this research strongly supporting the developed three-factor structure, 
additional safety measures should be compared in search of similar factor structures. The 
Air Force Safety Center publishes 14 additional safety measures utilizing a structure 
based on the HFACS model (AFSEC, n.d.-a). The methodologies utilized in this research 
can be applied to other published measures in search of similarities (or differences) 
between measure structures.  
 Additional analysis of AFCMRS nuclear maintenance safety climate survey data 
can also be accomplished. With only 20% of survey data utilized by this research, 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis should be accomplished to further strengthen the three-
factor structure. Further Exploratory Factor analysis may also be accomplished as this 
research’s initial latent root criterion suggested a potential fourth factor.  
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 Future research may also incorporate the possible predictive nature of safety 
climate measures (Choudhry et al., 2009; Morrow et al., 2014) by coupling this research 
with actual mishap data. The author recommends using mishap data from units 
participating in the AFCMRS nuclear maintenance safety climate survey and exploring 
the relationship between the factors identified and actual safety outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
 The intent of this study was to analyze current safety climate measurement 
devices in search of useful information regarding safety climate within the Air Force 
nuclear maintenance community. With three qualifiers of success (Identify measurable 
constructs, identify variables for trend analysis, and identify relationships between 
constructs and variable groups) this research met its purpose. A three-factor structure 
(Management Commitment, Training, and Resources) existed within the AFCMRS 
survey data and seven demographic variables provided insight into trends within the 
community. These findings support previous research regarding the existence of safety 
climate within organizations and provide a starting point for continuing research within 
the Air Force nuclear enterprise. 
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Appendix A: AFSEC Survey Questionnaire 
 
Organizational Processes 
1. In my squadron/organization, nuclear security is a key part of all operations. 
2. My squadron/organization closely monitors PRP qualifications. 
3. Personnel in my squadron/organization must possess the appropriate work 
experience and skills to receive qualifications. 
4. Security education and training are adequate in my squadron/organization. 
5. Maintenance records are correctly maintained, are accurate and controlled in 
my squadron/organization. 
6. My training records are well maintained and accurate in my 
squadron/organization. 
7. I am adequately trained to competently conduct my job. 
8. My squadron/organization adequately monitors daily operations to catch 
possible human errors. 
9. PRP certified individuals always notify their direct supervisors when they 
self-medicate for an illness. 
10. PRP certified individuals notify their certifying officials and competent 
medical authority when they receive medical care anywhere other than at 
their assigned MTF. 
11. In my squadron/organization, required tools and equipment are available and 
serviceable. 
12. Tool control is closely monitored in my squadron/organization. 
13. My squadron/organization makes effective use of the Competent Medical 
Authority (CMA) to help manage PRP personnel. 
14. QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are clearly stated. 
15. QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are enforced. 
16. Our work performance when deployed is of the same quality as our work 
performance when at home base. 
17. My squadron/organization adequately recognizes me or my subordinates for 
doing the correct procedures and maintenance activities. 
18. MAJCOM recognition programs adequately recognize my 
squadron/organization for outstanding nuclear security practices. 
19. In my squadron/organization, procedural guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, 
etc.) is available and current. 
20. Official guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) and understanding of nuclear 
surety procedures directs day-to-day decisions in my squadron/organization. 
21. Within my squadron/organization, effective communication exists up and 
down the chain of command. 
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22. My squadron/organization effectively communicates pertinent information 
during shift changes. 
 
Organizational Climate 
23. My squadron/organization is genuinely concerned about nuclear security. 
24. In my squadron/organization, everyone is responsible/accountable for nuclear 
security. 
25. Our squadron/organization environment promotes practices consistent with 
nuclear surety. 
26. Active duty and Reserve component personnel have the same perceptions of 
the nuclear surety mission. 
27. Peer influence discourages violations of AFI's/T.O.'s and nuclear security 
rules in my squadron/organization. 
28. Violations of AFI's/T.O.'s are rare in my squadron/organization. 
29. Squadron/organization members are encouraged to comply with standards 
when they accomplish their job/mission. 
30. Duty shifts and rest period policies are enforced in my squadron/organization. 
31. Individuals in my squadron/organization feel free to report PRP issues or 
security violations. 
32. Members of my squadron/organization work effectively as a team. 
33. Unprofessional behavior that compromises PRP standards is not tolerated in 
my squadron/organization. 
34. Unit PRP monitor positions are sought after in my squadron/organization. 
35. QA/QAE is a well respected element of my squadron/organization. 
36. QA/QAE positions are sought after in my squadron/organization. 
37. My squadron/organization has a reputation for high-quality performance. 
38. Squadron/organization members understand, believe in, and feel committed 
to the nuclear mission. 
39. Morale in my squadron/organization is outstanding. 
Resources 
40. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget, and 
equipment) to accomplish my job. 
41. Day/Night crew has sufficient staffing to meet workload demands in my 
squadron/organization. 
42. My squadron/organization has adequate personnel to perform its current 
tasks. 
43. Nuclear mission training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to operational 
commitments in my squadron/organization. 
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44. Nuclear surety training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to support of non-
nuclear mission requirements. 
45. Multiple job assignments and additional duties are distributed in a manner 
which allows unit members to perform their primary jobs. 
46. TDY deployment rates for the last year have not created safety problems in 
my squadron/organization. 
47. Deployment for non-nuclear surety missions does not degrade mission 
effectiveness in my unit. 
48. Day-to-day non-nuclear mission demands do not degrade mission 
effectiveness in my unit. 
49. Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest to 
perform their jobs. 
50. Squadron/Organization members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow 
them to obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs. 
51. My squadron/organization has sufficient manning/assets to perform its 
current tasks. 
Supervision 
52. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are actively engaged in the 
nuclear security program. 
53. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are successful in 
communicating mission goals to unit personnel. 
54. Supervisors/QA routinely monitor maintenance activities in my 
squadron/organization. 
55. Work center supervisors coordinate their actions in my 
squadron/organization. 
56. Leaders/Supervisors' decisions are respected in my squadron/organization. 
57. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization care for both members' 
quality of life and mission accomplishment. 
58. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization can be trusted. 
59. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization react well to unexpected 
changes. 
60. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization set the example for 
compliance with policy, rules, and instructions. 
61. Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron discourage cutting corners to get a job 
done. 
62. Supervisors encourage members in my squadron/organization to always 
complete work actions before signing off. 
63. Leadership in my squadron/organization encourages personnel to report 
incidents/accidents. 
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Open-ended response items 
64. The most significant action(s) my squadron can take to improve Nuclear 
Surety is(are): 
65. Use this space to provide any concern that you would like to comment upon. 
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Appendix B: Dimensions Found in Safety Literature and Redefinition for Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
accountability 1 Active supervisory practices
active practices 2 Active supervisory practices
activities 1 Unassigned
appreciation of safety work 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
attitude toward safety in the org 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
attitude toward safety within the group 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
attitudes 1 Management attitude
blame 1 Management Action
cell phone disapproval 1 Unassigned
clarity of safety rules 1 Communication Training
Communication 2 Communication
communication about safety 1 Communication
company policy 1 Management action
competence 1 Training
Confidence in safety procedures 1 Percieved Risk Equipment & Facilities
conflict/control 1 Unassigned
control of safety 1 Percieved Risk
controls of risk 1 Percieved Risk
declarative practices 2 Management attitude
delivery limits 1 Unassigned
design 1 Percieved Risk
driver safety priority 1 Percieved Risk
effect of safe conduct on social status 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
effect of safety on promotion 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
effect of work pace on safety 2 Safety v production
effects of safe conduct on promotion 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
effects of safe conduct on social status and promotion (rewarding safety) 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
Employee perception of how concerned management is 1 Management action
enactive 1 Management actions
encouragement/discipline for safety 1 Active supervisory practices Management Actions
equipment/maintenance 1 Equipment & Facilities
feedback on safety 1 Communication
Field Orientation (experience, communication, decision making) 1 Training Communication
Financial investment 1 Management Action Equipment & Facilities
formal rules and procedures 1 Management actions
General Training 1 Training
global self safety 1 Unassigned
group attitudes 1 Percieved Risk
how actively does management respond to concerns 1 Management action
importance of safety training 1 Training
importance of safety training program 1 Training
importance of training 2 Training
Individual responsibility 1 Unassigned
Influence of safety legislation 1 Management actions
knowledge 1 Training
level of risk 3 Percieved Risk
maintenance and management issues 1 Management Action Equipment & Facilities
management actions 1 Management Action
Listed Dimension Occurences Redifined as 
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management actions toward safety 2 Management Action
Management activity 1 Management Action
Management attitude toward safety 4 Management attitude
management attitudes 1 Management attitude
Management commitment 3 Management action
management commitment to safety 1 Management action
Management Concern 2 Management attitude
management enforcement 1 Management action
Management involvment 1 Management action
management knowledge 1 Management Action Training
Management satisfation 1 Management attitude
management support (meetings/hardware) 1 Management action
management values 1 Management attitude
Manager emphasis on safety 1 Management action
manager support 1 Management action
management encouragement/support 1 Management action
monitoring and control 1 Active supervisory practices
need for safety 1 Percieved Risk
openness 1 Communication
Organizational Support 1 Management action
participation 1 Active supervisory practices
Participation encouragement (ensuring PPE iw worn, getting buy-in) 1 Active supervisory practices
People 1 Unassigned
percieved risk 3 Percieved Risk
personal authroity 1 Percieved Risk
personal immunity 1 Unassigned
personal management contact 1 Active supervisory practices
personnel safety training 1 Training
physical work environment 1 Percieved Risk Equipment & Facilities
policy/procedures 1 Management action
prevention strategies 1 Active supervisory practices
Proactive practices 3 Active supervisory practices
production as priority 1 Safety v production
production v safety 1 Safety v production
promoting learning/improvement 1 Training Active supervisory practices
rewards for good work 1 Management actions
risk 3 Percieved Risk
risk level 3 Percieved Risk
risk perception 2 Percieved Risk
rules/regs 1 Management action
safety arrangements 1 Management actions
safety as part of productive work 1 Safety v production
safety as priority 1 Safety v production
safety attitudes 1 Management attitude
safety coaching 1 Active supervisory practices
safety communication 3 Communication
safety engagement 1 Active supervisory practices
safety level 2 Percieved Risk
Listed Dimension Occurences Redifined as 
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safety measures 1 Management actions Active supervisory practices
safety officer/promotion/training/committee 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
safety policy 1 Management action
Safety pro-activity 1 Active supervisory practices
safety procedures 1 Management actions Active supervisory practices
Safety promotion 1 Communication
safety rep status 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
safety representative authority 1 Status of Safety Management attitude
safety rules 1 Management actions Active supervisory practices
Safety Straight Talk 1 Communication
safety systems 3 Equipment & Facilities
Safety training 2 Training
Safety v competing goals 1 Safety v production
safety v production 1 Safety v production
satisfaction with training 1 Training
Schedule Flexibility 1 Unassigned
sharing safety values 1 Active supervisory practices
site management 1 Management Actions Management Attitude
speaking up 1 Communication
status of safety and social status/promotion 1 Status of Safety Management Attitude
status of safety committee 1 Status of Safety Management Attitude
status of safety officer 2 Status of Safety Management Attitude
status of safety officer/committee 2 Status of Safety Management Attitude
supervisor encouragement/support 1 Active supervisory practices
supervisor enforcement 2 Active supervisory practices
supervisor involvement 1 Active supervisory practices
supervisor knowledge 1 Training Active supervisory practices
supervisor satisfaction 1 Management Attitude
Supervisor support 1 Active supervisory practices
supervisors 1 Active supervisory practices
supervisory action 1 Active supervisory practices
Supervisory care (emotional intelligence, feedback, communication) 2 Active supervisory practices
supervisory expectation 1 Active supervisory practices
supportive environment 1 Active supervisory practices Status of Safety
training 2 Training
training and enforcement of policy 1 Training Active supervisory practices
training and management issues 1 Training Management Action
Trucks and Equipment 1 Equipment & Facilities
violations 1 Percieved Risk
work clarity 1 Communication
work conditions 1 Percieved Risk
work environment 1 Equipment & Facilities Percieved Risk
work place 1 Equipment & Facilities Percieved Risk
work practices 1 Percieved Risk
work presssure (safety v production) 2 Safety v production
Worker involvement in safety process 2 Active supervisory practices
Listed Dimension Occurences Redifined as 
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Appendix C: AFCMRS Measures selected for validation 
 
3 Personnel in my squadron/organization must possess the appropriate work experience and skills to receive qualifications 
6 My training records are well maintained and accurate in my squadron/organization 
7 I am adequately trained to competently conduct my job 
8 My squadron/organization adequately monitors daily operations to catch possible human errors 
11 In my squadron/organization, required tools and equipment are available and 
serviceable 
12 Tool control is closely monitored in my squadron/organization 
14 QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are clearly stated 
15 QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are enforced 
16 Our work performance when deployed is of the same quality as our work 
performance when at home base 
17 My squadron/organization adequately recognizes me or my subordinates for doing the correct procedures and maintenance activities 
19 In my squadron/organization, procedural guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) is available and current 
20 Official guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) and understanding of nuclear surety 
procedures directs day-to-day decisions in my squadron/organization 
21 Within my squadron/organization, effective communication exists up and down the 
chain of command 
22 My squadron/organization effectively communicates pertinent information during shift changes 
25 Our squadron/organization environment promotes practices consistent with nuclear surety 
26 Active duty and Reserve component personnel have the same perceptions of the 
nuclear surety mission 
27 Peer influence discourages violations of AFI's/T.O.'s and nuclear security rules in my 
squadron/organization 
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28 Violations of AFI's/T.O.'s are rare in my squadron/organization 
29 Squadron/organization members are encouraged to comply with standards when they 
accomplish their job/mission 
30 Duty shifts and rest period policies are enforced in my squadron/organization 
31 Individuals in my squadron/organization feel free to report PRP issues or security violations 
32 Members of my squadron/organization work effectively as a team 
33 Unprofessional behavior that compromises PRP standards is not tolerated in my 
squadron/organization 
34 Unit PRP monitor positions are sought after in my squadron/organization 
35 QA/QAE is a well-respected element of my squadron/organization 
36 QA/QAE positions are sought after in my squadron/organization 
37 My squadron/organization has a reputation for high-quality performance 
38 Squadron/organization members understand, believe in, and feel committed to the nuclear mission 
39 Morale in my squadron/organization is outstanding 
40 I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to accomplish my job 
41 Day/Night crew has sufficient staffing to meet workload demands in my squadron/organization 
42 My squadron/organization has adequate personnel to perform its current tasks 
43 Nuclear mission training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to operational 
commitments in my squadron/organization 
44 Nuclear surety training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to support of non-nuclear mission requirements 
45 Multiple job assignments and additional duties are distributed in a manner which allows unit members to perform their primary jobs 
46 TDY deployment rates for the last year have not created safety problems in my 
squadron/organization 
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47 Deployment for non-nuclear surety missions does not degrade mission effectiveness in my unit 
48 Day-to-day non-nuclear mission demands do not degrade mission effectiveness in my 
unit 
49 Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs 
50 Squadron/Organization members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs 
51 My squadron/organization has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current tasks  
52 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are actively engaged in the nuclear 
security program 
53 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are successful in communicating mission goals to unit personnel 
54 Supervisors/QA routinely monitor maintenance activities in my squadron/organization 
55 Work center supervisors coordinate their actions in my squadron/organization 
56 Leaders/Supervisors' decisions are respected in my squadron/organization 
57 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization care for both members' quality of life and mission accomplishment 
58 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization can be trusted 
59 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization react well to unexpected changes 
60 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization set the example for compliance with policy, rules, and instructions 
61 Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron discourage cutting corners to get a job done 
62 Supervisors encourage members in my squadron/organization to always complete 
work actions before signing off 
63 Leadership in my squadron/organization encourages personnel to report incidents/accidents 
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Appendix D: Data Validation Exercise Instructions 
 
AFCMRS Dimension Validation Exercise 
 
Introduction: 
Good afternoon, 
I am Capt Clements and this exercise is the next step in the continuation of my graduate 
thesis work.  I appreciate you taking the time to assist in this important work. As I read 
the instructions for this exercise, please take the time to enjoy the provided doughnuts. 
Motivation: 
The exercise today will consist of a matching exercise between a 53-item safety climate 
measure and 9 proposed dimensions drawn from thesis research. This exercise will 
ensure that the proposed dimensions have necessary levels of validity, and may be used 
for further analysis 
Disclaimer:  
This exercise is anonymous and no personal information will be gathered. Answers 
provided by participants are non-attributional. Information gathered will be used only 
within the scope of the author’s graduate thesis. 
Instructions: 
This exercise is expected to take no longer than one hour. If you need to take a break, 
please feel free to do so of your own accord. 
First, you will receive a single page of nine proposed dimensions for research. These 
dimensions have been drawn from literature relevant to the author’s thesis topic. Please 
read the items, along with their definitions, and let me know if you have any questions 
regarding content or concepts. 
[Provide definition sheet] 
[Field Questions] 
If everyone is comfortable with the definitions, I will now hand out the next portion of 
the exercise. Each participant will receive one copy of a 53-item safety climate measure. 
These 53 items were derived from the Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System 
survey. The items listed were deemed relevant to the author’s study, and additional items 
were removed if considered irrelevant. Additionally, order of questions was generated at 
random. You will receive a copy labeled as either Form 1 or Form 2. This label is for the 
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researcher’s purpose only and both copies of the exercise are composed of identical 
questions.  
[Provide question bank] 
Please read each item carefully and consider which dimension on the definition sheet that 
would apply to that item. All items are based on survey participant perception, so think of 
how each item listed would be linked to each perception. 
When answering, please write answers in the blank space to the right of each item. 
Answers should be in the form of the two-letter identifier to the left of each dimension 
definition. 
The answer that you should provide should be the best answer. If you feel that multiple 
dimensions may apply, please choose the one that you feel best relates. 
To clarify key terms: 
- “Management” refers to the leader(s) within an organization that have the power 
to make policy, but do not directly supervise line-workers. In the context of a 
squadron this would include the squadron commander 
- “Supervisors” refers to the leader(s) within an organization that are responsible 
for enacting and translating policy into practice. In the context of a squadron this 
would include first-line supervisors. 
If at any point you have a question, please feel free to ask the administrator. All 
questions, unless specifically requested by the participant inquiring, will have the answer 
provided to the group as a whole. Any feedback relating to the exercise is appreciated. 
Examples include, but are not limited to: exercise format, item ambiguity, definition 
ambiguity, overlapping concepts, etc. 
You may begin the exercise at this time. 
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Appendix E: Validation Test Definition Sheet 
 
DEFINITION SHEET 
(MA) Management Attitude: Perception of how management views safety 
(Declaratory policy, encouraging safe practices, and safety values) 
(MB) Management Action: Perception of actions taken by management. 
(Formal policy, rewarding/punishing, and support for safety) 
(SP) Safety vs. Production: Perception of the importance of safety in regard 
to other organizational goals like production 
(RE) Resources: Perception of adequacy and functionality of resources 
necessary for safety (manpower, equipment, facilities) 
(SS) Status of Safety: Perception of importance placed on entities enforcing 
safety policies (Quality Assurance, safety officers, safety committees, and 
other positions ensuring safety standards are observed) 
(CM) Communication: Perception of effectiveness of communication 
regarding safety (both upwards and downward) 
(TG) Training: Perception of the importance and efficacy of safety training 
(AS) Active Supervisory Practice: Perception of first-line supervisory 
involvement and influence on safety procedures and practices 
(PR) Perceived risk: Perception of risk level within the organization and 
adequacy of safety systems 
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Appendix F: Test Bank 1 
 
Day/Night crew has sufficient staffing to meet workload demands in my 
squadron/organization 
 
My squadron/organization adequately monitors daily operations to catch possible 
human errors 
 
Unprofessional behavior that compromises PRP standards is not tolerated in my 
squadron/organization 
 
Squadron/organization members understand, believe in, and feel committed to the 
nuclear mission 
 
QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are clearly stated  
Leaders/Supervisors' decisions are respected in my squadron/organization  
Peer influence discourages violations of AFI's/T.O.'s and nuclear security rules in my 
squadron/organization 
 
Squadron/Organization members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to 
obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs 
 
Active duty and Reserve component personnel have the same perceptions of the 
nuclear surety mission 
 
Our work performance when deployed is of the same quality as our work 
performance when at home base 
 
Leadership in my squadron/organization encourages personnel to report 
incidents/accidents 
 
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization can be trusted  
Deployment for non-nuclear surety missions does not degrade mission effectiveness 
in my unit 
 
Nuclear mission training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to operational 
commitments in my squadron/organization 
 
My training records are well maintained and accurate in my squadron/organization  
My squadron/organization effectively communicates pertinent information during 
shift changes 
 
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are actively engaged in the nuclear 
security program 
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Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization care for both members' quality of 
life and mission accomplishment 
 
Duty shifts and rest period policies are enforced in my squadron/organization  
Work center supervisors coordinate their actions in my squadron/organization  
Tool control is closely monitored in my squadron/organization  
Day-to-day non-nuclear mission demands do not degrade mission effectiveness in 
my unit 
 
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization set the example for compliance 
with policy, rules, and instructions 
 
Violations of AFI's/T.O.'s are rare in my squadron/organization  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are successful in communicating 
mission goals to unit personnel 
 
Morale in my squadron/organization is outstanding  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization react well to unexpected changes  
I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to 
accomplish my job 
 
I am adequately trained to competently conduct my job.   
QA/QAE positions are sought after in my squadron/organization  
Nuclear surety training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to support of non-nuclear 
mission requirements 
 
Individuals in my squadron/organization feel free to report PRP issues or security 
violations 
 
In my squadron/organization, procedural guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) is 
available and current 
 
My squadron/organization has adequate personnel to perform its current tasks  
Our squadron/organization environment promotes practices consistent with nuclear 
surety 
 
QA/QAE is a well-respected element of my squadron/organization  
In my squadron/organization, required tools and equipment are available and 
serviceable 
 
Multiple job assignments and additional duties are distributed in a manner which 
allows unit members to perform their primary jobs 
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Supervisors encourage members in my squadron/organization to always complete 
work actions before signing off 
 
Official guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) and understanding of nuclear surety 
procedures directs day-to-day decisions in my squadron/organization.  
 
Unit PRP monitor positions are sought after in my squadron/organization  
Squadron/organization members are encouraged to comply with standards when they 
accomplish their job/mission 
 
Personnel in my squadron/organization must possess the appropriate work experience 
and skills to receive qualifications 
 
My squadron/organization has a reputation for high-quality performance  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron discourage cutting corners to get a job done  
TDY deployment rates for the last year have not created safety problems in my 
squadron/organization 
 
My squadron/organization adequately recognizes me or my subordinates for doing 
the correct procedures and maintenance activities 
 
My squadron/organization has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current tasks  
Members of my squadron/organization work effectively as a team  
Within my squadron/organization, effective communication exists up and down the 
chain of command 
 
Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest to perform 
their jobs 
 
Supervisors/QA routinely monitor maintenance activities in my 
squadron/organization 
 
QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are enforced  
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Appendix G: Test Bank 2 
 
My squadron/organization adequately recognizes me or my subordinates for doing 
the correct procedures and maintenance activities 
 
In my squadron/organization, procedural guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) is 
available and current 
 
Active duty and Reserve component personnel have the same perceptions of the 
nuclear surety mission 
 
Squadron/Organization members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to 
obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs 
 
Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest to perform 
their jobs 
 
Day/Night crew has sufficient staffing to meet workload demands in my 
squadron/organization 
 
Work center supervisors coordinate their actions in my squadron/organization  
Our work performance when deployed is of the same quality as our work 
performance when at home base 
 
Official guidance (AFIs, AFMANs, T.O.s, etc.) and understanding of nuclear 
surety procedures directs day-to-day decisions in my squadron/organization.  
 
Supervisors encourage members in my squadron/organization to always complete 
work actions before signing off 
 
Personnel in my squadron/organization must possess the appropriate work 
experience and skills to receive qualifications 
 
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization care for both members' quality 
of life and mission accomplishment 
 
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are successful in communicating 
mission goals to unit personnel 
 
Violations of AFI's/T.O.'s are rare in my squadron/organization  
My training records are well maintained and accurate in my squadron/organization  
Leadership in my squadron/organization encourages personnel to report 
incidents/accidents 
 
QA/QAE is a well-respected element of my squadron/organization  
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QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are clearly stated  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron discourage cutting corners to get a job done  
I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget, and equipment) to 
accomplish my job 
 
My squadron/organization has adequate personnel to perform its current tasks  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization are actively engaged in the 
nuclear security program 
 
Multiple job assignments and additional duties are distributed in a manner which 
allows unit members to perform their primary jobs 
 
My squadron/organization adequately monitors daily operations to catch possible 
human errors 
 
My squadron/organization effectively communicates pertinent information during 
shift changes 
 
Members of my squadron/organization work effectively as a team  
Nuclear mission training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to operational 
commitments in my squadron/organization 
 
Duty shifts and rest period policies are enforced in my squadron/organization  
Nuclear surety training is rarely postponed/cancelled due to support of non-nuclear 
mission requirements 
 
In my squadron/organization, required tools and equipment are available and 
serviceable 
 
Individuals in my squadron/organization feel free to report PRP issues or security 
violations 
 
Squadron/organization members are encouraged to comply with standards when 
they accomplish their job/mission 
 
My squadron/organization has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current 
tasks 
 
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization can be trusted  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization react well to unexpected 
changes 
 
TDY deployment rates for the last year have not created safety problems in my 
squadron/organization 
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Our squadron/organization environment promotes practices consistent with nuclear 
surety 
 
Within my squadron/organization, effective communication exists up and down 
the chain of command 
 
QA/QAE positions are sought after in my squadron/organization  
Unprofessional behavior that compromises PRP standards is not tolerated in my 
squadron/organization 
 
Unit PRP monitor positions are sought after in my squadron/organization  
Leaders/Supervisors in my squadron/organization set the example for compliance 
with policy, rules, and instructions 
 
Deployment for non-nuclear surety missions does not degrade mission 
effectiveness in my unit 
 
I am adequately trained to competently conduct my job.   
Supervisors/QA routinely monitor maintenance activities in my 
squadron/organization 
 
Peer influence discourages violations of AFI's/T.O.'s and nuclear security rules in 
my squadron/organization 
 
Leaders/Supervisors' decisions are respected in my squadron/organization  
Day-to-day non-nuclear mission demands do not degrade mission effectiveness in 
my unit 
 
QA/QAE standards in my squadron/organization are enforced  
Tool control is closely monitored in my squadron/organization  
Morale in my squadron/organization is outstanding  
My squadron/organization has a reputation for high-quality performance  
Squadron/organization members understand, believe in, and feel committed to the 
nuclear mission 
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Appendix H: EFA Respecification Varimax Rotated Component Matrices 
 
  
   
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .273 .173 .687 .577
NSMX_6 .182 .212 .723 .600
NSMX_7 .115 .133 .725 .557
NSMX_8 .364 .192 .676 .626
NSMX_11 .184 .541 .435 .515
NSMX_17 .553 .369 .311 .539
NSMX_21 .619 .418 .290 .642
NSMX_22 .579 .370 .312 .569
NSMX_33 .503 .034 .566 .574
NSMX_35 .630 .275 .154 .496
NSMX_36 .578 .179 .091 .375
NSMX_40 .327 .745 .227 .714
NSMX_41 .275 .807 .142 .747
NSMX_42 .217 .860 .097 .797
NSMX_51 .244 .832 .092 .760
NSMX_53 .709 .275 .287 .661
NSMX_57 .716 .338 .246 .687
NSMX_59 .701 .330 .224 .651
NSMX_62 .577 .062 .483 .570
NSMX_63 .605 .037 .488 .605
Communal
ities
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 1
Component
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .316 .164 .658 .559
NSMX_6 .186 .216 .727 .610
NSMX_7 .111 .140 .738 .576
NSMX_8 .374 .195 .671 .628
NSMX_11 .205 .537 .421 .507
NSMX_17 .605 .355 .261 .560
NSMX_21 .682 .399 .227 .677
NSMX_22 .646 .351 .249 .602
NSMX_33 .512 .038 .559 .576
NSMX_35 .463 .335 .272 .400
NSMX_40 .321 .749 .226 .715
NSMX_41 .272 .809 .139 .748
NSMX_42 .203 .866 .103 .803
NSMX_51 .239 .835 .091 .762
NSMX_53 .748 .268 .246 .691
NSMX_57 .759 .328 .199 .724
NSMX_59 .742 .321 .178 .686
NSMX_62 .582 .068 .478 .572
NSMX_63 .605 .044 .485 .603
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Communal
ities
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 2
Component
p
nt
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .315 .166 .659 .561
NSMX_6 .180 .216 .728 .609
NSMX_7 .106 .140 .738 .575
NSMX_8 .367 .196 .674 .627
NSMX_11 .198 .537 .423 .507
NSMX_17 .602 .358 .266 .561
NSMX_21 .684 .403 .231 .683
NSMX_22 .648 .354 .253 .610
NSMX_33 .507 .041 .564 .577
NSMX_40 .316 .751 .230 .716
NSMX_41 .270 .811 .141 .751
NSMX_42 .198 .868 .106 .803
NSMX_51 .235 .836 .094 .764
NSMX_53 .745 .271 .252 .691
NSMX_57 .759 .332 .205 .728
NSMX_59 .743 .324 .184 .691
NSMX_62 .576 .071 .485 .572
NSMX_63 .599 .047 .492 .603
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Communal
ities
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 3
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .338 .139 .666 .578
NSMX_6 .203 .194 .735 .618
NSMX_7 .131 .115 .748 .590
NSMX_8 .385 .178 .670 .629
NSMX_11 .219 .516 .441 .509
NSMX_17 .618 .334 .271 .566
NSMX_21 .699 .379 .235 .688
NSMX_22 .661 .335 .252 .613
NSMX_40 .329 .745 .234 .717
NSMX_41 .279 .812 .143 .757
NSMX_42 .205 .873 .107 .816
NSMX_51 .242 .840 .095 .774
NSMX_53 .755 .256 .241 .693
NSMX_57 .770 .315 .199 .732
NSMX_59 .755 .306 .181 .696
NSMX_62 .582 .070 .458 .553
NSMX_63 .606 .044 .466 .586
Communal
ities
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 4
Component
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1 2 3
NSMX_3 .363 .120 .647 .565
NSMX_6 .204 .197 .744 .634
NSMX_7 .110 .134 .778 .635
NSMX_8 .396 .169 .666 .628
NSMX_17 .650 .305 .242 .574
NSMX_21 .723 .356 .214 .695
NSMX_22 .677 .319 .239 .618
NSMX_40 .356 .726 .219 .702
NSMX_41 .282 .817 .157 .771
NSMX_42 .200 .887 .131 .844
NSMX_51 .241 .849 .113 .791
NSMX_53 .743 .258 .255 .683
NSMX_57 .765 .311 .207 .724
NSMX_59 .748 .303 .189 .687
NSMX_62 .578 .063 .462 .551
NSMX_63 .602 .036 .469 .583
Communal
ities
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 5
Component
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .368 .101 .658 .578
NSMX_6 .210 .183 .751 .641
NSMX_7 .114 .122 .786 .646
NSMX_8 .396 .156 .675 .636
NSMX_17 .673 .271 .257 .592
NSMX_21 .754 .312 .234 .721
NSMX_22 .698 .286 .253 .633
NSMX_40 .368 .722 .219 .704
NSMX_41 .292 .818 .154 .778
NSMX_42 .211 .891 .126 .855
NSMX_51 .255 .848 .111 .797
NSMX_53 .747 .239 .269 .687
NSMX_57 .771 .291 .220 .728
NSMX_59 .756 .281 .203 .693
NSMX_63 .546 .073 .458 .513
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Communal
ities
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 6
Component
1 2 3
NSMX_3 .373 .090 .664 .588
NSMX_6 .218 .171 .757 .650
NSMX_7 .114 .120 .789 .649
NSMX_8 .398 .149 .678 .640
NSMX_17 .688 .249 .268 .607
NSMX_21 .774 .286 .249 .743
NSMX_22 .711 .266 .262 .645
NSMX_40 .374 .719 .219 .705
NSMX_41 .300 .816 .152 .779
NSMX_42 .220 .891 .125 .857
NSMX_51 .264 .846 .111 .798
NSMX_53 .742 .236 .267 .678
NSMX_57 .770 .285 .221 .723
NSMX_59 .758 .273 .207 .692
Communal
ities
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Rotated Component Matrixa
Run 7
Component
1 2 3
NSMX_3   .656 .599
NSMX_6   .756 .664
NSMX_7   .820 .706
NSMX_17 .696   .610
NSMX_21 .782   .744
NSMX_22 .721   .645
NSMX_40  .719  .705
NSMX_41  .817  .779
NSMX_42  .892  .858
NSMX_51  .847  .798
NSMX_53 .753   .679
NSMX_57 .778   .723
NSMX_59 .766   .693
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Factor Loadings < .4 are suppressed
Final Run
Component Communal
ities
Rotated Component Matrixa
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